A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protection for Aged Employees by Gillin, Leslie M.
Volume 35 Issue 2 Article 4 
1990 
A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate 
Protection for Aged Employees 
Leslie M. Gillin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie M. Gillin, A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protection for Aged Employees, 
35 Vill. L. Rev. 389 (1990). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital 
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova 
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
1990]
A TEST OF ARBITRABILITY: DOES ARBITRATION PROVIDE
ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR AGED EMPLOYEES?
I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of litigation in the United States has gone beyond our
courts' ability to respond.' For this reason arbitration 2 has become an
indispensable form of dispute resolution in the American system of ad-
ministering justice.3 Arbitration exists as a contractual alternative to liti-
gation in that the parties agree to binding arbitration in place of a court
decision. 4 In the labor area, arbitration is the predominant method of
resolving grievances of employees under collective bargaining agree-
ments. 5 The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 6 provides for the enforce-
1. See generally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM
(1985); Burger, Using Arbitration to Achieve Justice, ARB. J., Dec. 1985, at 3 (calling
for final, binding arbitration of all private contracts); Burger, Isn't There a Better
Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982) (same). The rate of civil litigation in the United
States continues to rise. In 1985, 273,670 cases were filed in federal district
courts. The caseload has more than doubled in the past decade. ADR AND THE
COURTS, A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 3 (E. Fine ed. 1987).
2. Although negotiation, mediation and conciliation are also effective alter-
natives to litigation, they are beyond the scope of this Note. For a comprehen-
sive discussion of these alternative forms of dispute resolution, see Perritt, "And
the Whole Earth Was of One Language "--A Broad View of Dispute Resolution, 29 VILL.
L. REV. 1221 (1983-84).
3. See AMERICAN ARBITRATION CASELOAD FIGURES (1985) (labor arbitration
under American Arbitration Association rules increased by 70% since 1972;
commercial arbitration, by 250%). The American Arbitration Association
(AAA) is primarily responsible for encouraging the growth and implementation
of arbitration in the United States. See M. DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION § 2:02 (G. Wilner rev. ed. 1984) [hereinafter DOMKE]. The AAA was
founded in 1926 as a non-profit organization to foster the study and administra-
tion of arbitration. Id. Today, the AAA Rules form the basis for arbitration pro-
cedures and the conduct of parties and arbitrators. Id.
4. See DOMKE, supra note 3, § 1:01. An arbitration agreement may be for-
mulated with regard to an existing dispute or to arbitrate disputes arising in the
future. R. COULSON, BUSINESS ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 15-16
(3d ed. 1986). Contractual arbitration is voluntary. Compulsory arbitration of
certain claims is also becoming commonplace in many jurisdictions. For exam-
ple, court-annexed arbitration requires parties to submit their dispute to arbitra-
tion before it will be tried. See Perritt, supra note 2, at 1304-05. This Note will
discuss voluntary arbitration.
5. Labor-management arbitration is a step in the collective bargaining pro-
cess which aids unions and employers in resolving their disputes. See R. COUL-
SON, LABOR ARBITRATION-WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 20-21 (3d ed. 1981). It
has been estimated that 96% of collective bargaining agreements provide for
binding arbitration of disputes arising under the agreement. J. STEINER, THE
ARBITRATION HANDBOOK 3 (1989). For a further discussion of labor-manage-
ment arbitration, see infra notes 29-61 and accompanying text.
6. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988).
(389)
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ment of private contractual agreements to arbitrate. 7 Despite this
widespread acceptance of arbitration, the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that when certain statutory claims are resolved in arbitra-
tion, the arbitrator's award is not preclusive, and the claim may also be
pursued in a judicial forum.8
In a series of recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has
sent a strong message that the FAA establishes a federal policy favoring
arbitration. 9 These cases indicate that the Supreme Court is no longer
7. Title 9, § 2 provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract." Id. § 2. The efficacy of arbitration depends onjudicial enforcement of arbitration agreements and arbitration awards once they
have been issued. The FAA gives courts the power to stay judicial proceedings
pending arbitration, compel arbitration and confirm arbitration awards. Id.§§ 3, 4, 9. For a discussion of arbitration under the FAA, see infra notes 62-113
and accompanying text. Arbitration awards are also entitled to preclusive effect.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 84(1) (1982) ("[A] valid and final
award by arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject
to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.").
8. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 289-92 (1984) (arbi-
tration award does not preclude individual's right to judicial forum for claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728,
745 (1981) (same with respect to claims under Fair Labor Standards Act); Alex-
ander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974) (same with respect to
claims under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964).
McDonald, Barrentine and Alexander arose in the context of labor arbitration.
In each case, the arbitration award was against the employee's union, and the
Court held that this award should not preclude the employee from asserting his
statutory rights in court. Although these cases addressed the preclusive effect of
an arbitration award, lower courts have applied the same rationale in refusing to
order arbitration of statutory claims, despite a predispute agreement to arbi-
trate. See, e.g., Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989) (mo-
tion to stay proceedings pending arbitration of employee's Title VII claim
denied despite arbitration agreement), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 842 (1990); Swen-
son v. Management Recruiters Int'l, 858 F.2d 1304, 1305-07 (8th Cir. 1988)
(refusal to compel arbitration of Title VII claim despite predispute agreement to
arbitrate), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 143 (1989); Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris
Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D.N.J. 1987) (same with respect to claims
under Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)). But see Pihl v. Thomson
McKinnon Secs., 48 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 922, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1988)(granting motion to compel arbitration of ADEA claim); Syracuse Supply Co. v.
English, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 331, 338 (N.D.N.Y. 1979) (Title VII
action stayed pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3 pending outcome of arbitration proceed-
ing). For a general discussion of the conflict between arbitration and certain
statutory policies, see Meltzer, Labor Arbitration and Discrimination: The Parties'
Process and the Public's Purposes, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 724, 724 (1976) ("[A]rbitration
is primarily an instrument of the parties' private purposes rather than a means
for achieving public purposes reflected in the law ...."); Sterk, Enforceability of
Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L.
REV. 481, 483 (1981) (public policy defense should be invoked when legislative
principles involved in dispute are designed to achieve some external policy
rather than foster justice between the parties).
9. Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1920 (1989) (upholding federal policy favoring arbitration); Shear-
son/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987) (FAA "man-
390 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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reluctant to compel arbitration of statu*tory claims once thought to be
beyond the scope of arbitration.' 0 In addition to establishing a federal
policy favoring arbitration, the Court has developed a "test of arbi-
trability.""1 This test provides that a party must abide by the terms of
an arbitration agreement unless it can be shown that Congress intended
"to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at
issue."12
In Nicholson v. CPC International Inc. 13 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit considered whether a claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)14 must proceed to arbitra-
dates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims"); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985) ("no
warrant in [FAA] for implying ... presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims"); Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985) (FAA
"requires that [the Court] rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)
("questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration"). For a discussion of these cases, see infra notes
86-113 and accompanying text.
10. See Rodriquez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922 (overruling Wilko v. Swann, 346 U.S.
427 (1953), to hold arbitration agreements enforceable with respect to claims
arising under § 12(2) of Securities Act of 1933); McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (arbitra-
tion agreements enforceable with respect to claims arising under § 10(b) of Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 and civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. 614 (arbitration agree-
ments enforceable with respect to claims arising under Sherman Act). In each of
these cases, the Court noted that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only sub-
mits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." Rodriguez,
109 S. Ct. at 1920; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 229-30; Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628; see
also Bird v. Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.),
vacated, 110 S. Ct. 225 (1989) (decision declining to enforce arbitration agree-
ment with respect to Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) claim
vacated for reconsideration after Rodriguez).
11. The McMahon Court outlined the test as follows:
The burden is on the party opposing arbitration.., to show that Con-
gress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statu-
tory rights at issue .... [S]uch an intent "will be deducible from [the
statute's] text or legislative history," . . . or from an inherent conflict
between arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.
482 U.S. at 227 (citations omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628 (1985)).
In developing this test, the Court has established clear guidelines for addressing
a conflict between arbitration and statutory claims, instead of relying on vague
notions of "public policy." For a discussion of arbitrability based on notions of
"public policy," see Sterk, supra note 8.
12. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27.
13. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). In Nicholson the plaintiff Nicholson en-
tered into an employment contract with CPC International Inc. (CPC) which
contained an agreement to arbitrate any future disputes between the parties. Id.
at 222-23. Nicholson was terminated and filed an age discrimination claim
against CPC. Id. at 223. CPC sought to compel arbitration of Nicholson's claim
according to the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement. Id.
14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The ADEA was enacted
in 1967 to prohibit age discrimination in employment and to promote employ-
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tion in accordance with the terms of a predispute agreement to arbitrate.
This case marked the first time that a federal appellate court applied the
"test of arbitrability" in an age discrimination case. 15 Employment dis-
crimination claims have traditionally received preferential treatment
from the Supreme Court on the issue of arbitrability, but the Court has
never ruled on the arbitrability of an ADEA claim.16
Although the Nicholson court applied the test of arbitrability, the
court did not follow the mandate of the FAA. Instead, the court held
that an employee could not be compelled to arbitrate his ADEA claim,
even though he signed an individual employment contract containing an
arbitration clause. 17 This Note suggests that the Nicholson court did not
properly apply the test of arbitrability.' 8 An analysis of the text and leg-
islative history of the ADEA fails to provide the congressional command
necessary to override the mandate of the FAA.' 9 The ADEA's goal of
eliminating age discrimination can be enforced through arbitration, con-
sistent with the strong mandate of the FAA.20
This Note traces the history and development of labor arbitration
and commercial arbitration under the FAA. 2 ' In setting forth the
Supreme Court's decisions in these two distinct areas of law, this Note
provides a framework for analyzing Nicholson, a hybrid case involving
both areas. 22 Finally, this Note's analysis of Nicholson concludes with a
proposed recommendation for protecting the rights of ADEA claimants
in arbitration proceedings under the FAA.2
3
ment of older workers based on ability. Id. § 621(b). For a discussion of the
history and procedures of the ADEA, see infra notes 115, 122-23, 132 & 136 and
accompanying text.
15. Other federal courts have addressed the issue of the arbitrability of
ADEA claims. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra note 118 and accom-
panying text. The Nicholson court, however, is the first federal appellate court to
apply the test of arbitrability to an ADEA claim since the Supreme Court articu-
lated the test in both McMahon and Rodriguez.
16. The Supreme Court has declined to give preclusive effect to arbitration
awards in cases involving claims under federal employment discrimination stat-
utes. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (42 U.S.C.
§ 1983); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (Fair La-
bor Standards Act); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Title
VII). For a further discussion of this preferential treatment, see infra notes 41-
58 and accompanying text.
17. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231.
18. For a discussion of the Nicholson court's application of the test, see infra
notes 129-43 and accompanying text. For a proposed correct application of the
test, see infra notes 163-202 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the text and legislative history of the ADEA, see infra
notes 122, 130-35, 142 & 171-78 and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of the compatibility of arbitration and the goals of the
ADEA, see infra notes 136-40 & 180-202 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 24-113 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 114-220 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 221-37 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35: p. 389
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II. BACKGROUND
Arbitration is a creature of contract. 24 It is a simple process of dis-
pute resolution, voluntarily chosen by the parties, in which an impartial,
private judge evaluates evidence and renders an award.2 5 The parties
agree in advance to accept this award as final and binding.2 6 The parties
also agree upon the rules to be followed in the arbitration procedure. 27
Arbitration agreements are favored by courts because arbitration re-
lieves congested dockets while still providing justice between the par-
ties.2 8 Generally, arbitration has evolved in two contexts: labor-
management arbitration evolved as a substitute for strikes, and commer-
cial arbitration developed as an alternative to litigation. 29
A. Labor-Management Arbitration
Labor arbitration is a primary means of resolving grievances in the
collective bargaining process.30 The collective bargaining process is
24. H. PERRITr, EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.20, at 148 (2d
ed. 1987).
25. See generally F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 2 (4th
ed. 1985).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 222. For this reason, arbitration statutes contain little detail
regarding the arbitration process from the time the arbitrator is selected until
the award is issued. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). Parties frequently agree to
arbitrate under the rules of the AAA. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 2:02. For a discus-
sion of the application of these rules, see infra notes 120 & 198 and accompany-
ing text.
28. See Note, Contractual Agreements to Arbitrate Disputes: Waiver of the Right to
Compel Arbitration, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1513, 1513 (1979). There are several other
advantages of arbitration: (1) arbitrators can be chosen for their expertise;
(2) the atmosphere is informal; and (3) the process is less expensive than litiga-
tion. See R. COULSON, supra note 4, at 9-10.
29. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 578 (1960). Arbitration has been described as an integral part of the labor
system of self-government: "[Tihe system is designed to aid management in its
quest for efficiency, to assist union leadership in its participation in the enter-
prise, and to secure justice for the employees. It is a means of making collective
bargaining work and thus preserving private enterprise in a free government."
Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1024
(1955). For a discussion of the development of commercial arbitration, see infra
notes 61-112 and accompanying text.
30. F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 153. Section 203(d) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) states that arbitration is the "desira-
ble method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C.
§ 173(d) (1982). Generally, a grievance is an assertion by a union member that
the collective bargaining agreement between the union and the employer has
been violated. F. ELKOURI & E. EKLOURI, supra note 25, at 155-56. Disputes as to
the meaning or application of the collective bargaining agreement are character-
ized as "rights" disputes. Id. at 98-99, 109-15. In contrast, "interests" disputes
relate to the formation of collective agreements. See id. at 98-99, 101-09. This
Note's background discussion focuses on the arbitration of "rights" disputes.
5
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controlled by the union on behalf of represented employees, rather than
by the individual employee.3 ' If the union and the employer are unable
to resolve their disputes under the contractual grievance procedure, the
dispute proceeds to the final step of arbitration.3 2 The labor arbitrator,
in deciding the dispute, is controlled by the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement.33
The enactment of section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA)3 4 in 1947 gave federal courts jurisdiction to hear suits for
the breach of collective bargaining agreements.3 5 Adding to this power,
the Supreme Court held in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills3 6 that
section 301 conferred jurisdiction on federal courts to create a body of
federal law for the enforcement of arbitration provisions in collective
bargaining agreements.3 7 In a trilogy of cases to follow, the Supreme
For statistics concerning the prevalence of arbitration in the collective bargain-
ing process, see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. H. PERRrr, supra note 24, § 3.9, at 135-38. Section 9(a) of the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982), provides that the union
is the exclusive representative of all employees in the bargaining unit. The
union, however, has a duty to fairly represent the grievant, and the grievant may
ask a court to relitigate the grievance upon a showing that this duty has been
breached. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564, 570-71
(1976) (employee's representation by union must not be "dishonest, in bad faith
or discriminatory"); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953)
(union has duty to "make an honest effort to serve the interests of all [its] mem-
bers, without hostility to any").
32. See R. COULSON, supra note 5, at 15. In an effective bargaining process,
less than 10% of a union's grievances will be decided in arbitration. Id. Addi-
tionally, union officials can screen out many grievances before they reach the
arbitration stage. Id.
33. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
597 (1960) ("[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the
collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand of
industrial justice."). Parties may also direct that the decision be consistent with
applicable law and arbitrators have fairly wide discretion in applying the law. See
F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 25, at 366-68. For a discussion of the ongo-
ing debate concerning an arbitrator's consideration of external law, see infra
notes 47 & 197 and accompanying text.
34. Ch. 120, § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 185 (1982)).
35. Section 301(a) provides that "[s]uits for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization... may be brought in any district court of
the United States having jurisdiction of the parties ..... 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982).
36. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). In Lincoln Mills, the collective agreement between
the union and employer provided for arbitration as the last step in the grievance
procedure. Id. at 449. Several grievances reached the arbitration step, and the
employer refused the union's request for arbitration. Id. The union brought
suit against the employer to compel arbitration. Id. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court held that the district court had properly granted specific performance of
the parties' agreement to arbitrate. Id. at 456.
37. The Court stated that "[t]he substantive law to apply in suits under
§ 301(a) is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws." Id.
394 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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Court defined the nature of collective bargaining and the roles of the
court and arbitrator in relation to the collective bargaining process.
3 8
The Steelworkers Trilogy established a national labor policy encouraging
labor arbitration as a method of industrial dispute settlement and gave
elevated status to arbitration awards.3 9 With the enactment of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,40 however, a conflict developed between
the national policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the na-
tional policy against employment discrimination embodied in Title
VII. 4 1 The Supreme Court confronted this conflict in Alexander v. Gard-
38. The following cases are referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy: United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (scope
of review of arbitration award defined; award legitimate so long as "it draws its
essence" from collective bargaining agreement); United Steelworkers v. Warrior
& Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1960) (presumption of arbi-
trability created, and "only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude
the claim from arbitration can prevail"); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 (1960) (federal courts prohibited from deciding merits of
grievance; courts' inquiry restricted to whether dispute falls under arbitration
clause). For a further discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy, see Ray, Court Review
of Labor Arbitration Awards Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 32 VILL. L. REV. 57, 57
n.2, 59 n.4, 61 n.ll (1987).
39. In Enterprise Wheel the Court established a rule of judicial deference to
arbitrators' decisions: "It is the arbitrator's construction which was bargained
for; ... [T]he courts have no business overruling him because their interpreta-
tion of the contract is different from his." 363 U.S. at 599. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB), which has jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
under 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982), has also indicated its preference for the prac-
tice of deferring to labor arbitration awards. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192
N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). In Collyer the NRLB set out five factors to consider for
deferral purposes: (1) the history of the parties' collective bargaining relation-
ship; (2) the absence of anti-union animus; (3) the willingness of the respondent
party to arbitrate; (4) the scope of the arbitration clause; and (5) the suitability of
the dispute for arbitration. Id. at 842; see also Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080, 1082 (1955) (NLRB should defer to arbitration award when arbitrator's
decision not clearly repugnant to purposes of NLRA); Timken Roller Bearing
Co., 70 N.L.R.B. 500, 501 (1946) (not within NLRB's discretion to permit union
to seek redress under NLRA after arbitration proceedings resulted in decision
on merits). For a further discussion of NLRB deferral, see Ray, Individual Rights
and NLRB Deferral to the Arbitration Process: A Proposal, 28 B.C.L. REV. 1 (1986);
Note, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver and Deferral to Labor Arbitration, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 403, 406-11 (1975).
40. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-el7 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
41. The conflict between these two policies has been clearly characterized
by the Supreme Court:
Two aspects of national labor policy are in [conflict] .... The first,
reflected in statutes governing relationships between employers and
unions, encourages the negotiation of terms and conditions of employ-
ment through the collective-bargaining process. The second, reflected
in statutes governing relationships between employers and their indi-
vidual employees, guarantees covered employees specific substantive
rights. A tension arises between these policies when the parties to a
collective-bargaining agreement make an employee's entitlement to
1990] NOTE 395
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ner-Denver Co.42 The Court, in a unanimous decision, held that an em-
ployee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII is not foreclosed
by the prior submission of his discrimination claim to final arbitration
under a collective bargaining agreement. 4 3
The Court characterized the Alexander decision as one determining
the "proper relationship" between federal courts and the arbitration
procedures of collective bargaining in the enforcement of an individual's
Title VII rights.44 The Court determined that federal courts were to
have final responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII. 4 5 Further, the
substantive statutory rights subject to contractual dispute-resolution
procedures.
Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 734-35 (1981). In enact-
ing Title VII, however, Congress indicated that it considered the policy against
discrimination to be of the "highest priority." See Newman v. Piggie Park En-
ters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
42. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Alexander, a black employee, had been discharged
and filed a grievance under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargain-
ing agreement between his union and Gardner-Denver Co. Id. at 38-39. The
collective agreement contained an arbitration clause, and binding arbitration
was the final stage in the grievance procedure. Id. at 40-42. The arbitrator de-
termined that Alexander had been discharged for just cause. Id. at 42. Prior to
arbitration, Alexander had filed a race discrimination charge with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and the EEOC had determined
that there had been no violation of Title VII. Id. at 42-43. After arbitration,
Alexander filed a civil action in federal court alleging that his discharge resulted
from racial discrimination in violation of Title VII. Id. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the conflict in the United States courts of appeals
and the conflict in national policies. Compare Oubichon v. North Am. Rockwell
Corp., 482 F.2d 569, 574 (9th Cir. 1973) (employee may seek more than one
remedy for discrimination, but may not recover twice for same injury) and
Hutchings v. United States Indus., 428 F.2d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 1970) (submis-
sion of discrimination grievances to arbitration is not election of remedies bar-
ring right to Title VII lawsuit) and Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711,
715 (7th Cir. 1969) (same) with Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54, 57-58
(5th Cir. 1972) (ultimate authority concerning Title VII rights is with federal
courts, but judicial deference' to arbitration decision allowed) and Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 332 (6th Cir.) (plaintiff barred from suing
under Title VII after final, binding decision by labor arbitrator), aff'd, 402 U.S.
689 (1970). For an extensive analysis of these conflicting positions, see Com-
ment, Policy Conflict: Should an Arbitration Award Be Allowed to Bar a Suit Under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964?, 20 UCLA L. REV. 84 (1972); Note, supra note
39, at 411-16.
43. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id. at 44. Title VII authorizes the EEOC to promote voluntary compli-
ance with the statute, conciliate disputes and institute civil actions. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(b), -5() (1982). Title VII provides for similar handling of Title VII
claims by state and local agencies. See id. § 2000e-5(c), -5(d). The Court felt that
since the EEOC was not empowered to adjudicate claims, final enforcement
power for Title VII rests with the federal courts. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 44-45.
Title VII grants courts the power to order injunctive relief, affirmative action,
reinstatement or back pay. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1982). From this
scheme, the Court found a general legislative intent to accord "parallel or over-
lapping remedies" against discrimination. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 47. Thus, the
8
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Court set forth three reasons for retreating from its former deference to
labor arbitration:4 6 (1) arbitration procedures are not adequate for the
resolution of Title VII claims;4 7 (2) an employee's individual statutory
rights under Title VII are independent of contractual rights under a col-
lective bargaining agreement; 4 8 and (3) a union may not provide ade-
quate protection of an employee's Title VII rights.4
9
Court concluded that submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude
later submission to another. Id. at 47-48, 59-60.
46. For a discussion of the Court's deference to labor arbitration, see supra
notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
47. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56. The Court cited several problems concerning
the arbitration of discrimination claims. First, the Court was concerned that an
arbitrator would not be bound to follow the directives of Title VII in deciding a
discrimination claim: "The arbitrator . . .has no general authority to invoke
public laws that conflict with the [collective bargaining agreement]." Id. at 53.
Thus, "[w]here the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Title VII, the
arbitrator must follow the agreement." Id. at 57; see United Steelworkers v. En-
terprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (arbitrator confined to
interpretation and application of collective bargaining agreement). Second, the
labor arbitrator has expertise in the "laws of the shop," but is not generally
familiar with public law concepts. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57. For this reason, the
Court held that the resolution of statutory/constitutional issues is a responsibil-
ity for the courts. Id. Third, the Court found that arbitral factfinding is not
equivalent to judicial factfinding: "The record of the arbitration proceedings is
not as complete; the usual rules of evidence do not apply; and . . .discovery,
compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often se-
verely limited or unavailable." Id. at 57-58. After pointing out such deficiencies
in arbitration, however, the Court reaffirmed its general endorsement of labor
arbitration: "This is not to suggest, of course, that arbitrators do not possess a
high degree of competence with respect to the vital role in implementing the
federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes." Id. at 57 n.18.
Many commentators have suggested that the Alexander Court's criticisms
sounded a "death-knell" for the federal policy favoring labor arbitration. See,
e.g., Siber, The Gardner-Denver Decision: Does It Put Arbitration in a Bind?, 25 LAB.
L.J. 708, 713-16 (1974) (discussing impact of decision on arbitration proce-
dures, reputation of arbitrators and desirability of arbitration). But see Aksen,
Post- Gardner-Denver Developments in Arbitration Law, ARBITRATION-1975, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING NATIONAL ACADEMY OF AR-
BITRATORs 24, 25 (1975) (arbitral feature of collective bargaining has earned its
reputation as substitute for industrial strife; Gardner-Denver will not signal its de-
mise); Note, supra note 39, at 403 (Alexander should not be viewed as reversal of
national policy favoring arbitration, but as refusal to extend policy in direct con-
flict with national antidiscrimination policy).
48. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 49-50. Article 5, § 2 of Alexander's collective bar-
gaining agreement provided that "there shall be no discrimination against any
employee on account of race." Id. at 39. The Court, however, found that em-
ployees have a nonwaivable, public right under Title VII that is separate and
distinct from the rights created through the "majoritarian processes" of collec-
tive bargaining. Id. at 51. The Court acknowledged the ability of the union to
waive statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the right to strike. Id.
(citing Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970)). The Court
held, however, that as an employee's Title VII rights to equal employment are
individual rights, they may not be prospectively waived by a union. Id.
49. Id. at 58 n.19. The Court was concerned that the union had exclusive
control over the presentation of an individual's grievance. The Court stated that
9
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The Supreme Court's refusal to give preclusive effect to a labor ar-
bitration award implicating statutory rights was extended beyond the
realm of Title VII in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System5 0 In Barren-
tine the Court held that an individual's right to a judicial forum under
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) 5 1 is not barred by prior submission
of his grievance to collective bargaining dispute procedures. 5 2 Whereas
"harmony of interest between the union and the individual employee cannot
always be presumed, especially where a claim of racial discrimination is made."
Id. (citing Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944);
Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944)). The Court found it note-
worthy that Congress extended the protections of Title VII against unions. Id.
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)). One commentator has argued that the Court's
awareness of the history of union discrimination was a major factor in the Alexan-
der decision:
The Court's willingness to depart from its long pattern of promotion of
arbitration makes sense only when one considers the unstated reasons
for its decision. Rather than the legislative history, the determinant ap-
pears to have been the Court's distrust, based on a lengthy record of
failure to prosecute, of the sincerity of unions in dealing with racial
grievances.
... [T]he fundamental reason for [the Court's] decision[] [is] that
the union-controlled arbitral process cannot be counted on to vindicate
these rights against discrimination.
Citron, Deferral of Employee Rights to Arbitration: An Evolving Dichotomy by the Burger
Court?, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 384 (1975) (footnotes omitted).
50. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). In Barrentine truck drivers were required to make
pre-trip safety inspections of vehicles assigned to them. Id. at 730. The drivers
were not compensated for this inspection time and, consequently, filed a claim
for wages under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 730-31. Their griev-
ances were rejected in final and binding arbitration, and the drivers filed suit in
federal district court under the minimum wage provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA). Id. at 731-32. The district court did not address the
FLSA claim. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed, emphasizing
that because the drivers had submitted their grievances to arbitration, they were
barred from asserting an FLSA claim in court. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 615 F.2d 1194, 1199-1200 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 728
(1981).
51. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). Congress enacted the
FLSA in 1938 to protect all covered workers from substandard wages and op-
pressive working hours, "labor conditions [that are] detrimental to the mainte-
nance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers ...." Id. § 202(a).
52. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745. As in Alexander, the Court was faced with
resolving a conflict between two contrary policies: one encouraging the negotia-
tion of terms and conditions of employment through arbitration, the other guar-
anteeing specific substantive rights to covered employees. Id. at 734-35. Before
Barrentine, those few courts considering the relationship between wage claims
and arbitration were divided on the issue. See Westerkamp, Barrentine: Mile-
stone or Detour?, 34 LAB. L.J. 46, 54 & n.35 (1983). In one significant case, Satter-
white v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1079 (1974), the court distinguished Alexander to hold that "[t]he high priority
which Congress has given to protection against racial discrimination has no ap-
plication to a dispute over rate of pay." Id. at 452.
The Barrentine Court ignored the analysis of the Eighth Circuit below and
prior FLSA cases, however, and reiterated its holding and rationale in Alexander
[Vol. 35: p. 389
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/4
1990] NOTE 399
Alexander had been a unanimous decision, a strong dissent in Barrentine
argued in favor of the national labor policy favoring arbitration. 5 3 Fur-
ther, in McDonald v. City of West Branch54 the Court held that when rights
are asserted in a civil action under section 1983, 55 a federal court should
not afford preclusive effect to an adverse arbitration award in the collec-
tive bargaining process.
5 6
Alexander, Barrentine and McDonald established precedent that a labor
arbitration award may not be used as a bar to an employee's assertion of
statutory rights in a judicial forum.57 Despite this precedent, certain
that arbitration procedures under a collective bargaining agreement do not ade-
quately protect individual statutory rights. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743-44. The
Court also looked at the enforcement scheme of the FLSA which grants individ-
uals broad access to the courts. Id. at 740 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). The
Court found that "[n]o exhaustion requirement or other procedural barriers are
set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to or
created by the statute." Id. For a comparison of the enforcement schemes of
the FLSA, Title VII, and the ADEA, see infra notes 130-33 & 145 and accompa-
nying text.
53. Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing
that the Court was moving in "a direction counter to the needs and interests of
workers and employers and contrary to the interests of the judicial system." Bar-
rentine, 450 U.S. at 746 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice sought to
distinguish Alexander on the basis of a "vast difference" between resolving a dis-
crimination claim and settling a typical wage dispute. Id. at 749 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting). Whereas unions have a history of discrimination, the union and the
employee are "traditional allies" in enforcing wage claims. Id. at 750 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting). The ChiefJustice was especially concerned with the increased
burden on federal courts from such elementary disputes. Id. at 752 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
54. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). In McDonald petitioner McDonald was discharged
from the West Branch police force and filed a grievance pursuant to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement between his union and the city. Id. at 285-86. After
receiving an unfavorable arbitration award, McDonald filed an action in federal
district court alleging that he had been discharged for exercising his first amend-
ment rights. Id. at 286.
55. The Reconstruction Era Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Sec-
tion 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute.., of any State... sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
56. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292. The Supreme Court applied its rationale
from Alexander and Barrentine to hold that arbitration could not provide an ade-
quate "substitute" for judicial proceedings in adjudicating § 1983 claims. Id. at
290-92. An additional factor in McDonald was the Court's interpretation of the
legislative history behind the statute: "[T]he very purpose of § 1983 was to in-
terpose the federal courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the
people's federal rights .... Id. at 2910 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 242 (1972)).
57. For additional Supreme Court cases in this area, see United States Bulk
Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351, 357 (1971) (seamen may assert wage
11
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language in the cases left unresolved questions about the future of labor
arbitration of statutory rights. For example, although the Alexander
Court rejected the argument that federal courts should "defer" to arbi-
tral decisions on discrimination claims, 58 it recognized that "great
weight" could be accorded to an arbitral decision that had given full
consideration to Title VII. 5 9 Additionally, despite its focus on the defi-
ciencies of the arbitral process, the Court encouraged employers and
claim in federal court under Seaman's Wage Act despite failure to pursue collec-
tively bargained arbitral remedies); McKinney v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R.,
357 U.S. 265, 268 (1958) (employee returning from military service need not
pursue arbitration prior to asserting seniority rights in federal court under Uni-
versal Military Training and Service Act).
58. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 & n.21. Respondent Gardner-Denver con-
tended that federal courts should defer to arbitral decisions where (1) the dis-
crimination claim was before the arbitrator; (2) the collective bargaining
agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the Title VII suit;
and (3) the arbitrator has the authority to rule on the claim and fashion a rem-
edy. Id. at 55-56. This deferral proposal is analogous to the NLRB's policy of
deferring to arbitration awards on certain statutory issues. For a discussion of
NLRB deferral, see supra note 39 and accompanying text. The Court rejected
this proposal and a stricter deferral standard set forth by the Fifth Circuit in Rios
v. Reynolds Metals Co., 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972). Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 &
n.20. For a discussion of the Rios standard, see NoteJudicial Deference to Arbitra-
tors' Decisions in Title VII Cases, 26 STAN. L. REV. 421 (1974).
59. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 & n.21. The "great weight" standard is set
forth in the Court's famous footnote 21:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral
decision, since this must be determined in the court's discretion with
regard to the facts and circumstances of each case. Relevant factors
include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining agree-
ment that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of proce-
dural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect
to the issue of discrimination, and the special competence of particular
arbitrators. Where an arbitral determination gives full consideration to
an employee's Title VII rights, a court may properly accord it great
weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, spe-
cifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the
basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful that
Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to provide a judi-
cial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment
claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this
forum.
Id. The Court also cited to this footnote in Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743 n.22, and
McDonald, 466 U.S. at 292 n. 13. This footnote continues to cause interpretation
problems in the lower courts. See Aksen, supra note 47, at 27 ("[W]hile uncon-
vinced of the soundness of the five-point Rios deferral standards, [the Court] has
nonetheless transposed them into a five-point 'great weight' rule of evidence.");
Edwards, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Cases: An Empirical Study, ARBI-
TRATION-1975, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 64-70 (1975) (judicial decisions since Alexander
have increased possibility that courts will defer to arbitrators' opinions in Title
VII cases); Note, Disarray in the Circuits After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 9
U. HAW. L. REV. 605, 641 (1987) (Congress or Supreme Court must set clearer
guidelines).
400
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employees to arbitrate grievances. 60 It appears that the Court, although
retreating from its former deferential posture, has not caused great
harm to the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes.
6 1
B. Arbitration in the Commercial Context
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 62 to counter
judicial hostility to arbitration.63 This hostility eventually disappeared
60. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 55. The Court outlined several reasons why em-
ployers and employees have a strong incentive to arbitrate grievances. For ex-
ample, the consequences of a strike may make arbitration essential. Id. The
Court also noted the benefits of arbitration as an "inexpensive and expeditious
means" for resolving disputes. Id. The Court stated that "[w]here the collec-
tive-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Title
VII and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well pro-
duce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee." Id.
The Court also left open the question of whether an employee could volun-
tarily waive his cause of action under Title VII as part of a voluntary settlement.
Id. at 52 & n. 15. For a further discussion of this waiver issue, see infra note 182
and accompanying text.
61. In fact, studies since Alexander have concluded that few arbitration
awards involving statutory issues are overturned. See Hoyman & Stallworth, Ar-
bitrating Discrimination Grievances in the Wake of Gardner-Denver, MONTHLY LAB.
REV., Oct. 1983, at 3, 6 (17% of arbitral decisions were reviewed by courts; only
1.2% were reversed); see also J. STEINER, supra note 5, at 258 n.44 (courts have
only occasionally used their authority to review arbitrated discrimination griev-
ances). With this hindsight, it is arguable that the Supreme Court may have
recognized that arbitration is effective in protecting Title VII rights.
Additionally, in contrast to Alexander, Barrentine and McDonald, the Supreme
Court has favored labor arbitration in other cases. See United Paperworkers Int'l
Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1987) (reviewing court's refusal to
enforce arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreement limited to
situations where interpretation violates well defined public policy); W.R. Grace
& Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 764 (1983) (federal court may not
overrule arbitrator's decision simply because court believes its interpretation of
collective agreement is better one); Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70 (1975) (Alexander policy favoring de novo review
of Title VII claims does not mean that minority employees may bypass grievance
and arbitration procedure when racial grievance involved).
62. Act of February 12, 1925, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended at
9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (1988)).
63. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1924) ("[T]he need for
the law arises from an anachronism of our American law."). A hostility to arbi-
tration evolved because under the English judicial system, from which much of
early American law derived, courts were compensated for cases heard. Judges
were thus reluctant to lose fees to an arbitrator. See Note, Arbitrability of Disputes
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1139 (1986). English
courts also viewed arbitration procedures as ousting the court from its jurisdic-
tion. See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983
(2d Cir. 1942) (discussing history of judicial approach). By 1889 English law
made agreements to arbitrate existing or future disputes irrevocable. Sayre, De-
velopment of Commercial Arbitration Law, 37 YALE L.J. 595, 607 (1928). English
common law arbitration was then adopted in the United States. Id. at 612. En-
acted in 1925, the FAA placed arbitration agreements on an equal footing with
other contracts. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1924). As of
13
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in the federal courts and, with the exponential growth of litigation, arbi-
tration under the FAA is now an encouraged form of dispute resolu-
tion. 64 As recently noted by the Supreme Court, "we are well past the
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the
competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration.' '65
The primary objective of the FAA is to enforce arbitration provi-
sions in commercial contracts. 6 6 The scope of the FAA has also been
extended beyond commercial transactions to enforce the arbitration of
disputes in many areas. 6 7 The FAA provides two enforcement proce-
dures. Section 3 provides for the stay of judicial proceedings on "any
1986, 45 states had adopted statutes enforcing agreements to arbitrate. Note,
supra, at 1139-40 & n.32.
64. For a discussion of the expansion of federal dockets and encourage-
ment of arbitration, see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
65. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 626-27 (1985).
66. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("A written [arbitration] provision in ... a con-
tract evidencing a transaction involving commerce ... shall be valid, irrevocable
and enforceable ....").
67. Courts have liberally interpreted the FAA's requirement that the con-
tract evidence a "transaction involving commerce." See Erving v. Virginia
Squires Basketball Club, 468 F.2d 1064, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1972) (contract be-
tween professional basketball player and club is "contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce" within meaning of 9 U.S.C. § 2); Prima Paint Corp. v.
Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 401 n.7 (1967) (refusing to limit FAA
to "contracts between merchants for the interstate shipment of goods"). The
FAA has been used to decide disputes arising under individual employment con-
tracts, insurance agreements, license agreements and medical malpractice suits.
See generally DOMKE, supra note 3, § 13:00.
One court has held that the FAA
is intended to apply in as wide an area as is within the constitutional
reach of Congress and federal law is to prevail as to all matters arising
under the statute.
[Flederal policy regarding the enforceability of contracts to
arbitrate is so pervasive that arbitration should be decreed in any case
where federal standards are met.
Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. The S.S. Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp.
236, 237-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) (citations omitted).
The extent to which the FAA is applicable to labor arbitration is a debated
issue. Section 1 of the FAA provides: "[N]othing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of
workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
Courts are divided on whether collective bargaining agreements are "contracts
of employment" within the meaning of § 1. See Ray, supra note 38, at 64-66.
Courts are also divided on whether the legislative history of the FAA, which
reveals that Congress was concerned with commercial, and not labor arbitration,
is conclusive on the issue. See id at 75-81. In any event, the FAA has been used
to expand federal labor law. See generally H. PERRrIr, supra note 24, § 3.22, at
152 & n.49 (discussion of use of FAA by federal courts to supply substantive law
in labor arbitration cases).
402 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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issue referable to arbitration" pending that arbitration,68 and section 4
establishes a procedure for compelling a party to submit to arbitra-
tion.6 9 The FAA also provides forjudicial enforcement, 70 vacation, 7 1 or
modification 72 of an arbitration award. When confronted with enforce-
ment of an arbitration agreement, a federal court can decide issues re-
garding the making and the scope of performance of the arbitration
agreement, but cannot decide on the merits of the dispute.73 A major
limitation on the parties' ability to compel arbitration under the FAA
can arise, however, when public or statutory policy demands that the
dispute be resolved in a judicial forum.7 4
The Supreme Court was first confronted with reconciling the policy
68. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1988).
69. Id. § 4.
70. Id. § 13. Section 13 provides in relevant part that
[t]he judgment . . .entered [on the arbitration award] shall have the
same force and effect ... as, and be subject to all the provisions of law
relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had
been rendered in an action in the court in which it is entered.
Id.
71. Id. § 10. Section 10 sets forth the following grounds for vacation:
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or un-
due means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbi-
trators, or either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to
hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imper-
fectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the
agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court
may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
72. Id. § 11.
73. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-
04 (1967). While parties to an arbitration agreement cannot be compelled to
arbitrate a dispute that is not within the scope of the agreement, federal courts
have applied a lenient standard in determining this scope. See Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) ("any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration"); Sharon Steel Corp. v. Jewell Coal & Coke Co., 735 F.2d 775, 778
(3d Cir. 1984) (court must only determine if claim of arbitrability is "plausible").
For a detailed discussion of the approach of federal courts in determining the
issue of arbitrability, see Note, supra note 63, at 1147-52.
74. See Lindsay, "Public" Rights and Private Forums: Predispute Arbitration Agree-
ments and Securities Litigation, 20 Lov. L.A.L. REV. 643, 644 (1987) (raising ques-
tion: "[W]here a statute creates a cause of action and provides a remedy, may
parties contractually agree in advance ... to resolve ... controversies based on
[that] statute... in a private forum?"); Sterk, supra note 8, at 483. For a discus-
sion of the conflict between statutory policies and the national policy favoring
labor arbitration, see supra notes 40-61 and accompanying text.
1990] NOTE 403
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behind the FAA and a contrary statutory policy in Wilko v. Swan.7 5 In
Wilko a customer had signed an agreement to arbitrate any future con-
troversies with his broker. 76 Despite this agreement, the customer
brought suit against the broker under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933
Act). 7 7 Contrary to the judicial attitude favoring arbitration and the pol-
icies of the FAA, the Court held that the statutory right under the 1933
Act to select a judicial forum could not be waived by a predispute agree-
ment to arbitrate. 78 The Court found that the policy behind the 1933
Act was to protect investors, and this policy could not be adequately
enforced in the arbitration process. 79
Over the years the Wilko doctrine has gone through a process of
erosion.8 0 The scope of arbitration has been extended in piecemeal
75. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
76. Id. at 432 & n.15.
77. Id. at 428. Wilko sued his broker and brokerage firm under the 1933
Act for misrepresenting material facts in the sale of a security. Id. at 428-29.
The 1933 Act, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988), created a
regulatory scheme governing the conduct of all securities issuers, underwriters,
dealers and brokers. In § 12(2) of the Act, Congress gave purchasers of securi-
ties a remedy for misrepresentation by a seller. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). Sec-
tion 22 of the 1933 Act gave the purchaser broad access to federal or state
courts. Id. § 77v. This and other provisions of the 1933 Act were supported by
§ 14 thereof which states that "[any condition, stipulation, or provision binding
any person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provision of this
subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the [SEC] shall be void." Id. § 77n.
The Wilko Court focused on the question whether the grant of federal jurisdic-
tion in § 22(a) was a waivable provision. For a general discussion of the 1933
Act, see McCauliff & Tyms, New Protections in Arbitrating Public Securities Disputes in
the Wake of McMahon: Foregone Conclusion or Will-o-the- Wisp?, 34 VILL. L. REV. 25,
30 (1989).
78. Wilko, 346 U.S. at 438. The Court determined that an agreement to
arbitrate is a stipulation to waive the securities purchaser's right of forum selec-
tion under the 1933 Act. Id. at 434-35. The Court found that § 14 of the 1933
Act (voiding waivers) was designed to assure that sellers could not maneuver
buyers into a position that might weaken their ability to recover under the 1933
Act. Id. at 435. The Court noted that "[w]hen the security buyer.., waives his
right to sue in courts, he gives up more than would a participant in other busi-
ness transactions. The security buyer has a wider choice of courts and venue.
He thus surrenders one of the advantages the Act gives him .... " Id.
79. Id. at 435-36. The Court set forth two criticisms of the arbitration pro-
cess: (1) arbitrators are "without judicial instruction on the law," and, as no
complete record of the proceedings is required, their statutory analysis cannot
be examined; and (2) the power to vacate an award and the opportunity for
judicial determination of legal issues are limited. Id. at 436. In contrast, Justice
Frankfurter noted in his dissenting opinion that the majority's opinion did not
rest on any evidence in the facts or record "of which [it could] take judicial no-
tice ... that the arbitral system . . . would not afford the plaintiff the rights to
which he is entitled." Id. at 439 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
80. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1920 (1989) (discussion of erosion culminates in express overruling of
Wilko).
404
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fashion to many areas of federal statutory concern.81 This erosion pro-
cess has culminated in recent decisions by the Supreme Court which
have strengthened and expanded the FAA.8 2
The decline of Wilko began in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.8 3 The
Scherk Court refused to extend the Wilko doctrine to a claim under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act).8 4 The Court held that the
parties' agreement to arbitrate should be enforced in accordance with
the provisions of the FAA.8 5 Furthermore, in three decisions following
81. See id. (1933 Act); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (1934 Act and RICO); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (antitrust laws); Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985) (federal preemption of state law);
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (1934 Act); see also Bird v.
Shearson Lehman/American Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.), vacated, 110
S. Ct. 225 (1989) (decision denying arbitrability of ERISA claims vacated for
reconsideration after Rodriguez).
82. For a discussion of these recent decisions, see infra notes 83-113 and
accompanying text. One commentator has accurately summarized the expanded
state of the FAA:
(1) [It] requires arbitration of statutory disputes in both international
and domestic contexts, (2) creates a body of substantive federal law that
is preemptive and binding on the states, (3) mandates arbitration of
pendent arbitrable state law claims in federal statutory cases, and
(4) mandates the arbitration of federal statutory claims absent a clear
Congressional intent to the contrary.
Ginger, Managing Securities Disputes After McMahon: A Call for Consolidation and
Arbitration, 33 VILL. L. REV. 515, 524 (1988) (footnotes omitted).
83. 417 U.S. 506 (1974). In Scherk an American company, Alberto-Culver,
purchased several business enterprises and trademark rights from a German citi-
zen. Id. at 508. The contract of sale contained a clause providing for arbitration
of any disputes in Paris under the rules of the International Chamber of Com-
merce. Id.
84. Id. at 513-14. The 1934 Act regulates actions in the securities market-
place. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-k (1988). Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it unlaw-
ful for any seller or purchaser of securities on a national exchange to engage in
any fraudulent or deceitful practice. See id. § 78j(b). Numerous lower courts had
extended the Wilko doctrine to bar arbitration of claims under § 10(b) of the
1934 Act. See Malcolm & Segall, The Arbitrability of Claims Arising Under Section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act: Should Wilko Be Extended?, 50 ALB. L. REV. 725,
754 n.176 (1986).
85. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 519-20. The Scherk Court observed in dicta that
Wilko was not controlling in a case under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act: "[A] colorable
argument could be made that even the semantic reasoning of the Wilko opinion
does not control the case before us .... There is no statutory counterpart of
§ 12(2) [of the 1933 Act] in the [1934 Act]." Id. at 513. For a discussion of the
differences between the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, see McCauliff & Tyms, supra
note 77, at 33-36. Despite the Court's discussion of the differences between the
1933 Act and the 1934 Act, the Court based its decision on "crucial differences"
between the arbitration agreement in Wilko and in the present case. Scherk, 417
U.S. at 515. In Wilko, there was no question that United States securities laws
would apply. Id. In Scherk the Court was primarily concerned with conflict-of-
law problems arising in an international context and held that "[a] contractual
provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated
and the law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to
17
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Scherk,8 6 the Court gave strength to the FAA by granting it preemptive
status.8 7 Finally, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 
8 8
achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international
business transaction." Id. at 516. The Scherk Court also noted that its conclu-
sion was confirmed by international developments and domestic legislation sub-
sequent to Wilko. Id. at 520 n. 15. For example, in 1970 the United States adopted
the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards,June 10, 1958, 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997. Chapter 2 of the FAA,
9 U.S.C. § 201, provides for enforcement of the Convention. Scherk, 417 U.S. at
520 n.15.
86. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). One commentator has referred to these cases
as the "Second Arbitration Trilogy": "The Court has put its imprimatur on a
federalization of arbitration law comparable to its role in the dramatic evolution
of labor arbitration in the early 1960's." Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy:
The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1306 (1985). For a dis-
cussion of the first trilogy, known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, see supra notes 38-39
and accompanying text.
87. In these three cases, the Supreme Court established the FAA, through
federal preemption, as the governing law in state courts. The Court first ad-
dressed the issue of preemption in Moses H. Cone and concluded that, as a matter
of substantive federal law, the FAA established "a liberal federal policy favoring
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural pol-
icies to the contrary." Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24. The Court ruled that a
federal court must compel arbitration under the FAA, even when a prior state
action was pending for a declaratory judgment that the dispute was not arbitra-
ble. Id. at 25-27. In Southland Corp. the Court held that § 2 of the FAA is not
procedural, but substantive federal law enacted under Congress' commerce
power. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 11. Thus, the FAA preempts any state law
that undermines the FAA's policy of enforcing arbitration awards. Id. at 16; see,
e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (FAA preempted provision of
state labor code which allowed wage collection suit despite existence of arbitra-
tion agreement); see generally Comment, Commercial Arbitration: Southland Corp.
v. Keating-Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act Preempts State Law in the Field of
Commercial Arbitration, 10 J. CORP. L. 767 (1985). In Dean Witter the Court ex-
tended the mandate of the FAA to state claims. Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 216-17.
The Court rejected the "doctrine of intertwining" which holds that when arbi-
trable and nonarbitrable claims arising out of the same transaction are suffi-
ciently intertwined, a district court may use its discretion and try all of the claims
in federal court. Id. The Court held that district courts are required under the
FAA to compel arbitration of arbitrable pendent state law claims despite any
intertwining of those claims with nonarbitrable federal claims. Id. at 217. The
Court noted that "[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in [enacting the FAA]
was to enforce private agreements [to arbitrate] . . .and that concern requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate, even if the result is 'piece-
meal' litigation." Id. at 221.
In addition to granting preemptive status to the FAA, the Dean Witter deci-
sion is significant in that Justice White's concurring opinion furthered the ero-
sion of Wilko. In Dean Witter Byrd brought suit alleging violation of § 10(b) of
the 1934 Act, and the Court decided that the § 10(b) issue was not properly
before it. Id. Justice White, however, elaborated on the issue of the arbitrability
of § 10(b) claims, stating that "Wilko's reasoning cannot be mechanically trans-
planted to the 1934 Act," and the premise that 1934 Act claims are not arbitra-
ble "is a matter of substantial doubt." Id. at 224 (White, J., concurring).
88. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). Mitsubishi involved a dispute arising under an in-
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the Supreme Court set forth a strong policy that the FAA mandates en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements, even when statutory
claims are involved. 89 The Court found "no warrant in the [FAA] for
implying in every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitra-
tion of statutory claims." 90
In Mitsubishi the Court set forth a test of arbitrability for statutory
claims whereby a party must abide by the terms of an arbitration agree-
ment unless it can be shown that Congress intended to preclude waiver
of a judicial forum for the statutory rights at issue. 9 1 Finding no such
congressional intent in the Sherman Act,9 2 the Court uprooted a well-
supported antitrust policy exception to the FAA. 9 3 The Court ordered
ternational contract for the distribution of automobiles between Japanese and
Puerto Rican companies. Id. at 616-17. The sales agreement between these two
companies contained a clause providing for arbitration of disputes by the Japan
Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. at 617. Mitsubishi brought suit in fed-
eral court to compel arbitration of the parties' contractual dispute under 9
U.S.C. § 4 and the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards. Id. at 618-19. Soler counterclaimed against Mitsubishi for an-
titrust violations under the Sherman Act. Id. at 620. The district court ordered
arbitration of the contract and antitrust claims. Id. The Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit reversed with respect to arbitration of the antitrust claims. Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
89. Id. at 625.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 628. The Court outlined a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the par-
ties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory issues; and (2) whether "legal
constraints external to the parties' agreement foreclosed the arbitration of those
claims." Id.
92. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988).
93. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-37. Prior to Mitsubishi, arbitration had not
been considered a proper means of resolving antitrust disputes. See Farber, The
Antitrust Claimant and Compulsory Arbitration Clauses, 28 FED. B.J. 90, 94 (1968);
Note, Private Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. IND.
& COM. L. REV. 406 (1969). The leading case in this area, American Safety
Equipment Corp. v.J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968), had held
that although there was no general distrust of arbitrators or arbitration, the
"pervasive public interest" in enforcement of the antitrust laws mandated that
antitrust claims be resolved in a judicial forum. Id. at 827-28. This holding,
later referred to as the "American Safety doctrine," had four principal compo-
nents: (1) private parties play a pivotal role in enforcement of the antitrust laws
through private actions for treble damages; (2) contracts generating antitrust
disputes may be contracts of adhesion; (3) antitrust issues are too complex for
the arbitral process; and (4) arbitrators chosen from the business community
may not make impartial decisions as to antitrust regulation of business. Mitsub-
ishi, 473 U.S. at 632.
Although the Mitsubishi Court limited its holding to arbitration of antitrust
claims in an international context, it criticized the exclusion of antitrust issues
from domestic arbitration: "At the outset, we confess to some skepticism of cer-
tain aspects of the American Safety doctrine." Id. The Court weighed the con-
cerns of American Safety against its strong belief in the necessity of arbitration in
international disputes as outlined in Scherk. Id. at 631. The Court found the
American Safety court's concern regarding contracts of adhesion to be unjustified
in that a party resisting arbitration could always attack the validity of the arbitra-
1990] NOTE 407
19
Gillin: A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protec
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
arbitration pursuant to the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement
and the FAA.
94
Less than five years after striking down the antitrust exception to
arbitration in Mitsubishi, the Court had to weigh the FAA policy favoring
arbitration against the policies of the 1933 Act, the 1934 Act and the
Racketeer' Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 95 In
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon96 the Court was faced with
reconciling Mitsubishi's overwhelming support for arbitration with
Wilko's hostility toward the arbitration of securities disputes. The Mc-
Mahon Court added force to the federal policy favoring arbitration and
declined to extend the Wilko rationale to claims under the 1934 Act and
RICO. 9
7
tion agreement on contract grounds. Id. at 632. In addition, the Court rejected
the notion that antitrust matters were too complex for an arbitral tribunal. The
Court noted that agreements to arbitrate antitrust disputes after the dispute
arises have been held acceptable. Id. at 633 (citing Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41,
48 (5th Cir. 1974); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972)). The Court also rejected any presumption
of partiality, noting that international arbitrators are drawn from both the legal
and business communities. Id. at 634. Finally, the Court addressed the core of
the American Safety doctrine-the role of the private cause of action in enforcing
American democratic capitalism through the antitrust laws. Id. at 634-37. The
antitrust plaintiff has been likened to a private attorney-general who protects the
public's interests. Id. at 635 (citing American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826). Addition-
ally, the treble damages remedy conferred on private parties by § 4 of the Clay-
ton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, has been cited as a "crucial deterrent to potential
[antitrust] violators." Id. The Court, however, examined the legislative history
behind the antitrust laws and found that the treble damages provision is primar-
ily remedial rather than punitive in nature. Id. at 635-36. The Court concluded
that there is no reason that such a remedy may not be sought in an arbitration
proceeding. Id. at 636-37.
94. Id. at 640. The Court concluded that "concerns of international com-
ity," and the "need of the international commercial system for predictability in
the resolution of disputes" required enforcement of the parties' agreement to
arbitrate. Id. at 629. The Court directed national courts to "shake off the old
judicial hostility to arbitration." Id. at 638.
95. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
96. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). Eugene and Julia McMahon filed suit against
Shearson and its registered representative, alleging state law fraud claims and
fraudulent trading on their account in violation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
RICO. Id. at 223. Shearson moved to compel arbitration under § 3 of the FAA
pursuant to an arbitration clause in the McMahons' customer agreements. Id.
The district court ordered arbitration of all claims but the RICO claim. Mc-
Mahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 384, 389 (S.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S.
220 (1987). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, applying the Wilko
rationale, held that the 1934 Act claims were nonarbitrable. McMahon v. Shear-
son/American Express, Inc., 788 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 220
(1987). Prior to its decision in this case, the Second Circuit had extended the
Wilko holding to claims arising under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. See Allegaert v.
Perot, 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977). For a discussion
of the Court's holding in Wilko, see supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
97. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 228, 242.
[Vol. 35: p. 389
20
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/4
McMahon was an influential decision for several reasons. First, it
resolved a substantial split among the circuits as to the arbitrability of
1934 Act claims. 98 Second, the Court addressed the arbitrability of civil
RICO claims for the first time.99 But most significantly, the Court clari-
fied the Mitsubishi test, establishing strict guidelines for courts to apply
when balancing the competing policies behind the FAA and a federal
statute. 10 0 Under the McMahon test of arbitrability, congressional intent
"to preclude waiver ofjudicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue"
must be demonstrated (1) in the text or legislative history of the statute
or (2) from an "inherent conflict" between arbitration and the statute's
purposes.' 0 '
The McMahon Court applied this test to the 1934 Act and RICO and
found no text or legislative history indicating Congress' intent to pre-
clude waiver of a judicial forum, 10 2 nor any inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statutes' purposes.' 0 3 Accordingly, the Court or-
98. See id. at 225 n. 1 (comparison of appellate court positions on arbitration
of 1934 Act claims); Malcolm & Segall, supra note 84, at 754 n.176.
99. See McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225 n.2 (comparison of appellate court posi-
tions on arbitrability of RICO claims); Lindsay, supra note 74, at 690-94 (advo-
cating resolution of split in circuits in favor of arbitrability of RICO claims).
100. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226-27. The Court clarified the test by as-
signing burdens. For a discussion of the Court's application of this test in Mit-
subishi, see supra notes 91 & 93 and accompanying text.
101. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227. The Court clearly articulated that the
McMahons must demonstrate that Congress intended to make an exception to
the FAA for claims arising under the 1934 Act and RICO. Id.
102. Id. at 227, 238. Congress did not address the arbitrability of § 10(b)
claims in the text of the 1934 Act. The Court found that § 29(a) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a), which prohibits waiver of any provision of the Act, only
applies to the Act's substantive obligations. Id. at 228. The Court found that
§ 27 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, which gives federal courts exclusive jurisdic-
tion for violations of the Act, was a procedural, not substantive, provision which
could be waived by an arbitration agreement. Id. Thus, the Court concluded
that § 27 of the 1934 Act failed to evince the requisite congressional intent to
preclude waiver of a judicial forum. Id. at 238. Additionally, the Court distin-
guished the non-waiver provision of the 1934 Act from a similar provision in the
1933 Act which had been applied in Wilko. Id. at 228. The Court stated that
" Wilko must be understood.., as holding that the plaintiff's waiver of the 'right
to select the judicial forum,' ... was unenforceable only because arbitration was
judged inadequate to enforce the statutory rights created by § 12(2)." Id. at
228-29 (quoting Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435). In contrast to Wilko, the McMahon
Court found that arbitration was an adequate forum for the resolution of 1934
Act claims. Id. at 238.
Unlike the 1934 Act, the Court found nothing in the text of the RICO stat-
ute that even "arguably evinces" a congressional intent to preclude arbitration
of RICO claims, and the legislative history was silent. Id. at 238-39.
103. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 238, 242. In addressing potential inherent con-
flicts between arbitration and the purposes of the 1934 Act, the Court rejected
Wilko's criticisms of arbitration as reflecting a "general suspicion of the desirabil-
ity of arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals." Id. at 231. The
Court found that such criticisms were irreconcilable with the Court's subsequent
1990] NOTE 409
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dered arbitration of all the claims. 10 4 In establishing a mandate that
agreements to arbitrate be enforced with respect to statutory claims, the
Court gave enduring strength to the FAA and gave contracting parties a
strong incentive to arbitrate. 0 5
As a result of McMahon, investors attempted to avoid arbitration by
gaining access to the federal courts under section 12(2) of the 1933 Act
and Wilko. 10 6 In Rodriquez de Quias v. Shearson/American Express, Inc. 107
decisions involving the FAA. Id. at 231-32. For a discussion of the Court's re-
jection of these criticisms in Mitsubishi, see supra note 93 and accompanying text.
The Court noted that Wilko's mistrust of the arbitration process was also
misplaced in light of changes in the regulatory structure of the securities laws.
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 233. Since the 1975 amendments to § 19 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78s, the SEC now has expansive power to ensure the adequacy of
the arbitration procedures employed by self-regulatory organizations (SROs),
i.e., the national securities exchanges and registered securities associations. Id.
Under these amendments, no change in SRO rules can be made without SEC
approval and the SEC has broad power to modify any SRO rules. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78s(b)(2)-(c) (1988). For a further discussion of the 1975 amendments and
the current rules employed in securities arbitration, see McCauliff & Tyms, supra
note 77, at 46-50.
With respect to the McMahons' RICO claim, the Court found no "irrecon-
cilable conflict" between arbitration and RICO's underlying purposes. McMa-
hon, 482 U.S. at 242. The Court, noting that antitrust matters are just as
complex as RICO claims, reaffirmed its statement in Mitsubishi that "potential
complexity should not suffice to ward off arbitration." Id. at 239 (quoting Mit-
subishi, 473 U.S. at 633). The Court also addressed the argument, which it had
previously rejected in Mitsubishi, that the public interest in enforcement of RICO
and the deterrent nature of the statute's treble damages provision precludes
submission of RICO claims to arbitration. Id. at 240-41. The Court again em-
phasized that the treble damages provision served more of a remedial than a
policing function. Id. Finally, the Court noted that because civil RICO is more
typically used against legitimate enterprises, instead of against organized crime
as intended, "[tlhe private attorney general role for the typical RICO plaintiff is
simply less plausible than it is for the typical antitrust plaintiff, and does not
support a finding that there is an irreconcilable conflict between arbitration and
enforcement of the RICO statute." Id. at 242.
104. Id. at 238, 242.
105. Id. at 226. "The Arbitration Act thus establishes a 'federal policy
favoring arbitration,' . . . [and the] duty to enforce arbitration agreements is not
diminished when a party bound by an agreement raises a claim founded on stat-
utory rights." Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
106. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S.
Ct. 1917, 1922 (1989) (noting need for uniformity between 1933 Act and 1934
Act to discourage litigants from manipulating allegations under securities laws
to avoid arbitration).
107. 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989). In Rodriguez the petitioners brought an action
against Shearson/American Express alleging violations of the 1933 Act and the
1934 Act. The district court ordered arbitration of the 1934 Act claims, but
followed Wilko in denying arbitration of the 1933 Act claims. Id. at 1919. The
Fifth Circuit reversed, ordering arbitration of all the claims because the
Supreme Court's subsequent decisions had rendered the Wilko doctrine obso-
lete. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Lehman Bros., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th
Cir. 1988), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1917 (1989).
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the Court finally and expressly overruled Wilko and held that a predis-
pute arbitration agreement is enforceable with respect to claims under
the 1933 Act.10 8 The Court found that Wilko was pervaded by "the old
judicial hostility to arbitration,"' 109 a hostility that had gone through a
process of "erosion." ' 11 0 Rodriquez ended any confusion with respect to
arbitration of securities disputes and furthered the FAA's policy of en-
forcing all contractual agreements to arbitrate. Il
The FAA has come a long way since its enactment in 1925. It is now
definitively established as a substantive federal law requiring "rigorous
enforcement" of arbitration agreements. 1 2 The Supreme Court's
favorable view of arbitration of statutory claims is most adequately sum-
marized by its statement in Mitsubishi: "By agreeing to arbitrate a statu-
tory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the
statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a
judicial, forum."' "13 As this background discussion has demonstrated,
however, the right of a party to enforce a predispute arbitration agree-
ment with respect to statutory claims may depend on distinctions be-
tween labor and commercial arbitration, and the nature of the rights at
issue.
III. DISCUSSION
In Nicholson v. CPC International Inc. "4 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit considered the arbitrability of a claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).11 5 Nicholson
108. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1922. The Court found that it would be "unde-
sirable for the decisions in Wilko and McMahon to continue to exist side by side,"
and therefore overruled Wilko. Id.
109. Id. at 1920 (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading
Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
110. Id. For a discussion of this erosion process, see supra notes 80-105 and
accompanying text. The Court also noted that the broad venue and jurisdic-
tional provisions of the 1933 Act which the Wilko Court found to be non-waiv-
able are present in other federal statutes which have not been interpreted to
prohibit enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct.
at 1920-21 (citing McMahon (construing § 27 of 1934 Act and RICO) and Mitsub-
ishi (construing antitrust laws)).
111. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
112. Id. at 1920 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985)).
113. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628.
114. 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). Circuit Judge Sloviter wrote the opinion
of the court. Circuit Judge Becker filed an opinion dissenting in part.
115. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The ADEA prohibits
employment discrimination based on age by certain employers, employment
agencies and labor organizations. Id. § 623(a)-(c). The purposes of the ADEA
are to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than
age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help em-
ployers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of
age employment." Id. § 621(b).
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marked the first time that a federal appellate court applied the test of
arbitrability' 16 to an age discrimination claim since the Supreme Court's
declaration in Rodriquez, McMahon and Mitsubishi (the "Third Trilogy")
that the mandate of the FAA extends to statutory claims. 1" 7 The
Supreme Court has never ruled on the arbitrability of an ADEA
claim. 118
A. Overview of the Decision
The plaintiff Nicholson was employed by CPC International Inc.
(CPC) pursuant to an individual employment contract." 9 This contract
116. See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226
(1987). For a discussion of the application of this test in McMahon, see supra
notes 100-04 and accompanying text.
117. See Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1920; McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226; Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 625. It is suggested that the term "Third Trilogy" is an appropriate
recognition of the Supreme Court's recent overwhelming support for the arbi-
tration of statutory claims. For a discussion of the "First Trilogy" (the Steelwork-
ers Trilogy) and the "Second Trilogy," see supra notes 38-39 & 86-87 and
accompanying text.
118. Other courts have addressed this issue, applying an analysis similar to
that used by the majority in Nicholson. See Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.,
836 F.2d 1544, 1553 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Alexander rationale to deny
preclusive effect to arbitration award in subsequent ADEA suit); Criswell v.
Western Airlines, Inc., 709 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying same rationale to
deny deference to arbitrator's interpretation of collective bargaining agreement
in subsequent ADEA suit), aff'd on other grounds, 472 U.S. 400 (1985); Jones v.
Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot & Mannino, P.C., 670 F. Supp. 597, 604 (W.D. Pa. 1987)
(court applied Alexander rationale in support of refusal to arbitrate ADEA claim
pursuant to terms of individual employment contract); Steck v. Smith Barney,
Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D.N.J. 1987) (same); Horne v. New
England Patriots Football Club, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 465, 470 (D. Mass. 1980)
(same). But see Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.
1990) (court declined to follow Nicholson and ordered arbitration of ADEA
claim); Garfield v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., No. 88-3027, slip op. at 4-8 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 16, 1988) (no congressional intent behind ADEA prohibiting waiver of
right to judicial forum); PihI v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., 48 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 922, 925-26 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (rationale of Alexander and Barrentine
inapplicable to case involving arbitration of ADEA claim under individual em-
ployment contract).
119. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 222. Nicholson was hired as an attorney by CPC
in 1957 and became Vice-President for Corporate Financial Services in 1981. Id.
In 1986, in anticipation of a possible takeover, Nicholson and other corporate
officers signed executive employment agreements which defined compensation,
benefits, job title and termination procedures. Id. at 222-23.
The issue whether the FAA applies to employment contracts was not raised
in this case. It is noted that several state statutes providing for enforcement of
agreements to arbitrate future disputes have specifically excluded employer-em-
ployee disputes from their coverage. See, e.g., MD. CTS. &JUD. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 3-206 (1984) (excluding employer-employee agreements unless expressly pro-
vided for in agreement). In light of the Supreme Court's decisions, however,
that the FAA preempts any state law that undermines the enforcement of arbi-
tration agreements, such exclusions may have little effect. See Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). For a discussion of the application of the FAA
beyond commercial contracts, see supra note 67 and accompanying text.
412
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contained an arbitration clause. 120 After having worked for CPC for
thirty years, Nicholson was informed that his position was being elimi-
nated in a corporate restructuring. 12 1 Nicholson then filed an age dis-
crimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).1 2 2 The charge was terminated at Nicholson's re-
126. The arbitration clause provided:
Any dispute or controversy arising under or in connection with this
Agreement shall be settled exclusively by arbitration, conducted before
a panel of three arbitrators in New York City in accordance with the
rules of the American Arbitration Association then in effect. Judgment
may be entered on the arbitrators' award in any court having jurisdic-
tion. The expense of such arbitration shall be borne by the company.
Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. Although not decided in the case, the majority and
dissenting opinions expressed different views concerning application of the AAA
Rules. The Nicholson majority argued that the AAA Commercial Arbitration
Rules should be applied. Id. at 228 n.7; see Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, reprinted in R. COULSON, supra note 4, at 33-40
[hereinafter Commercial Rules]. The dissent was of the opinion that the AAA
Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules were applicable. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at
234 n.4, 240 n.10 (Becker, J., dissenting); see Employment Dispute Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association, reprinted in Coulson, Fair Treat-
ment-Voluntaiy Arbitration of Employee Claims, ARB. J., Sept. 1978, at 23, 27-29
[hereinafter Employment Rules]. The Employment Rules were created in re-
sponse to concerns with delays in government employment antidiscrimination
agencies and the federal courts. Id. at 25. It has also been suggested that the
Employment Rules were issued in response to Alexander's criticisms of the ade-
quacy of the arbitral forum for determination of discrimination claims. See Nich-
olson, 877 F.2d at 234 n.4 (Becker, J., dissenting). The Employment Rules
provide for discovery, formal rules of evidence and other procedural safeguards
which are usually lacking in labor arbitration, and under the Commercial Rules.
See Coulson, supra, at 24-25, 28. For a proposal applying the Employment Rules,
see infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
121. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. Studies have found that the majority of
ADEA claimants, like Mr. Nicholson, are upper-middle class professional em-
ployees. See, e.g., Schuster & Miller, An Empirical Assessment of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 64, 68 (1984) (study of 153 federal
court cases indicated that majority of ADEA suits brought by well paid profes-
sional/managerial employees over age of 50). Because these individuals are
rarely union members, they are not covered by seniority provisions in collective
bargaining agreements. Id. at 68-69; see generally Inside Views of Corporate Age Dis-
crimination: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982).
122. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. The ADEA gives the EEOC administrative
responsibilities, broad investigative authority and litigation powers. See 29
U.S.C. § 626 (1982). In 1978, this enforcement authority was transferred to the
EEOC from the Department of Labor. See Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3
C.F.R. 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366 (1988) and in 92 Stat. 3781
(1978). The ADEA also authorizes enforcement by individual grievants. See 29
U.S.C. § 626(c) (1982).
The initial procedural requirement under the ADEA is that a charge alleg-
ing unlawful discrimination be filed with the EEOC. Id. § 626(d). This charge
must be filed within 180 days following the alleged discrimination. Id.
§ 626(d)(1). If the individual resides in a state that has a statute prohibiting age
discrimination in employment and an agency empowered to grant relief under
the statute, the individual must file a charge with both the state agency and the
25
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quest, and Nicholson filed an ADEA suit against CPC.12 3 In the district
court CPC moved for an order compelling arbitration of Nicholson's
claims, but was denied. 124 The Third Circuit granted CPC's petition for
leave to appeal. 12 5
The Third Circuit commenced its analysis of Nicholson with an ac-
knowledgement that the Supreme Court is no longer "reluctant" to
compel arbitration of statutory claims. 126 In its recognition of the Third
Trilogy, the court applied the McMahon "test of arbitrability."' 127 The
EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discrimination. Id. § 626(d)(2). For a
more detailed discussion of the procedures and remedies of the ADEA, see infra
notes 123, 132 & 173-76 and accompanying text.
123. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. After filing a charge, the aggrieved individ-
ual must wait 60 days before filing a lawsuit. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). The
purpose of this period is to allow time for the EEOC to attempt to "effect volun-
tary compliance with the [ADEA] through informal methods of conciliation, con-
ference, and persuasion." Id. § 626(b). The lawsuit must be brought within a
two-year statute of limitations, unless the cause of action arises out of a willful
violation, in which case the statute of limitations is three years. Id. § 626(e). For
a detailed discussion of the procedural complexities of the ADEA, see Proce-
dures-Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1626.1-.19 (1989);
2 H. EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 17 (1988); A. RUZICHo, L. JACOBS & L.
THRASHER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION §§ 2.27-.33 (1989).
124. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 46 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1019, 1023
(D.N.J. 1988), aff'd, 877 F.2d 221 (3d Cir. 1989). In denying CPC's motion to
compel arbitration of the ADEA claim, the district court relied on its previous
opinion in Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 661 F. Supp. 543 (D.N.J.
1987) which held that ADEA claims were nonarbitrable. Nicholson, 46 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. at 1021. The district court rejected CPC's argument that Steck, which
was decided before the Supreme Court's decision in McMahon, must be reas-
sessed. Id. at 1023. The court found that the McMahon test had been adequately
applied in Steck because the Steck court found a "Congressional intent to pre-
clude waiver ofjudicial remedies under the ADEA." Id. at 1022. The Steck court
relied on the Supreme Court's decisions in Alexander and Barrentine and the
"analogous statutory schemes" of Title VII and the FLSA. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at
545-46. For a discussion of the Nicholson court's reliance on the reasoning in
Alexander and Barrentine, see infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text.
125. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. CPC had requested the district court to
certify its order denying arbitration for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b). Id.
126. Id. The court cited the "federal policy favoring arbitration" expressed
in Rodriguez, McMahon and Mitsubishi. Id. at 223-24. For a discussion of the fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration, see supra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
127. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 226. For a discussion of the application of this
test in McMahon and Rodriguez, see supra notes 100-11 and accompanying text.
Under this test, Nicholson had the burden of showing that Congress intended
that there be an exception to the FAA for arbitration of ADEA claims. This
intent can be shown in the ADEA's text or legislative history or by an inherent
conflict between arbitration and the purposes of the ADEA. Nicholson, 877 F.2d
at 224.
One commentator has stated that three primary issues exist with regard to
the effect of arbitration on claims arising under the ADEA: (1) Can a grievant
who loses an age discrimination complaint at arbitration pursue judicial relief
under the ADEA or does the arbitrator's decision have preclusive effect?; (2) If
an ADEA suit may be pursued subsequent to an adverse arbitration award, how
[Vol. 35: p. 389
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Third Circuit affirmed the district court's decision and held that Con-
gress did not intend that the right to a judicial forum under the ADEA
could be displaced by a predispute agreement to arbitrate. 128
B. Application of The Test of Arbitrability
In its application of the McMahon test of arbitrability, the court first
examined the text of the ADEA and found no reference to arbitra-
tion. 12 9 The court next examined the legislative history of the ADEA
and noted a careful structuring by Congress of the ADEA's enforcement
procedures. 130 Congress chose to incorporate the enforcement provi-
sions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) into the ADEA.' 3 ' The
FLSA provisions permit suits by either the Secretary of Labor or the
injured individual. 132 From this scheme, the majority concluded that
"Congress made a deliberate policy choice in favor of enforcement of
ADEA claims in court proceedings."' 3 3
much deference should be given to the arbitrator's decision?; and (3) Must a
party who wishes to pursue an ADEA complaint first proceed under the provi-
sions of a contractual agreement to arbitrate before bringing an ADEA suit in
federal court? 3 H. EGLIT, supra note 123, § 19.32. The "test of arbitrability"
encompasses all of these issues, and a failure of the test requires enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate under the FAA.
128. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 230-31.
129. Id. at 224.
130. Id. Congress debated the utilization of three different enforcement
procedures: (1) amend Title VII to include age as a protected class, see 110
CONG. REC. 2599, 13,4992 (1964); (2) model the enforcement scheme of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) which provided for the resolution of
claims through administrative hearings, see 113 CONG. REC. 2795 (1967) (state-
ment of Sen. Yarborough); and (3) adopt the enforcement scheme of the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA), see id at 2199 (statement of Sen. Javitz). See gener-
ally Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings on S. 830 and S. 788 Before the Sub-
comm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
24-25, 396 (1967) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on ADEA]; Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment: Hearings on H. R. 3651, H. R. 3768, and H. R. 4221 Before the General Sub-
comm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 12-13
(1967) [hereinafter House Hearings on ADEA].
131. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226; see H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
5-6 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2213. Section
7(b) of the ADEA provides that "[t]he provisions of this Chapter shall be en-
forced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in
sections 211(b), 216 and 217 of [the Fair Labor Standards Act]." 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(b) (1982).
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1982) (incorporating FLSA enforcement provi-
sions into ADEA); id. § 216(b) (individual may initiate lawsuit, or Secretary of
Labor may file suit on individual's behalf); id. § 217 (Secretary may seek equita-
ble relief restraining violations). Although the ADEA originally incorporated
these provisions of the FLSA, ADEA enforcement responsibility has been trans-
ferred from the Secretary of Labor to the EEOC. See supra note 122 and accom-
panying text.
133. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226. The majority also stated that a 1978
amendment to the ADEA indicated a legislative preference for judicial resolu-
tion of ADEA claims. The 1978 amendment added a provision to toll the statute
27
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Notwithstanding this conclusion, the majority found that the legisla-
tive history of the ADEA was not "conclusive" regarding arbitration of
ADEA claims.134 The Nicholson majority proceeded to the second ele-
ment of the McMahon test to determine whether there was an "inherent
conflict" between arbitration and the purposes of the ADEA. 13 5 The
majority found a clear congressional intent that the EEOC oversee com-
pliance with the ADEA. 136 The EEOC's oversight and investigatory
powers are triggered by the filing of a charge under the ADEA. -13 7 The
majority reasoned that because the filing of a charge with the EEOC is a
prerequisite to court action under the ADEA, employees will have little
incentive to file charges if they must resolve their claims in arbitra-
tion. 138 Thus, the majority concluded that arbitration detracts from the
EEOC charge process and undermines Congress' design of the
ADEA. 13 9 The majority also concluded that arbitrators lack the power
to award appropriate relief under the ADEA. 140
of limitations for filing suit under the ADEA for up to one year pending comple-
tion of EEOC conciliation efforts. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2) (1982). The major-
ity concluded that this tolling provision suggests an intent that "extrajudicial
methods of seeking resolution [i.e., conciliation] of age discrimination claims
should not impede ultimate resolution of those claims in a judicial forum when
extrajudicial methods prove[ ] inadequate." Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226.
134. Id. at 227. The majority also conceded that the explicit right to a jury
trial under the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2) (1982), was not a factor in deter-
mining congressional intent to preclude waiver of a judicial forum. Nicholson,
877 F.2d at 226 n.5. The Supreme Court ignored the effect of such a provision
under RICO in McMahon and the Sherman Act in Mitsubishi.
135. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227.
136. Id. The court outlined the EEOC's obligation and powers to enforce
the ADEA. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(a) (1982) (EEOC has power to investigate in
accordance with § 9 and § 11 of FLSA); id. § 626(c) (power to effectuate volun-
tary compliance with statute through informal methods); id. § 628 (power to is-
sue rules and guidelines); id. § 632 (submission of annual report to Congress);
see also 29 C.F.R. § 1626.15(a) (1989) (EEOC may investigate, gather data, in-
spect records, interview employees); id. § 1626.16 (authority to issue subpoe-
nas); id. § 1626.4 (EEOC may receive information concerning alleged ADEA
violations "from any source" and conduct investigations "on its own initia-
tives"); id. § 1626.13 (EEOC has independent investigative authority despite re-
quest by charging party to withdraw charge).
137. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227. For a discussion of the charge requirement,
see supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
138. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227. The majority stated that "of course, ag-
grieved parties can go to the EEOC in any event, as the dissent argues, but they
are not likely to do so." Id. (emphasis in original). The majority, however, gave
no support for this conclusion.
139. Id. "Any procedure that detracts from [this] requirement would un-
dermine Congress' design, since the charge not only informs the EEOC of the
particular discrimination but also may identify other unlawful practices." Id.
140. Id. at 228. The majority cited two reasons for this conclusion: (1) ar-
bitrators do not have the same power as courts to award broad equitable relief
under the ADEA; and (2) arbitration cannot proceed as a class action. Id. at 228-
29. For a further discussion of the majority's arguments, see infra notes 194-201
and accompanying text.
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The Nicholson majority found that this inherent conflict between ar-
bitration and the ADEA was sufficient to override the mandate of the
FAA and allow the plaintiff to pursue a judicial remedy. 14 1 Judge
Becker, in his dissent, made an in-depth application of the test of arbi-
trability and found nothing in the legislative history of the ADEA to indi-
cate an intent by Congress to preclude waiver of a judicial forum. 14 2
Further, he found no "inherent conflict" between arbitration and the
purposes of the ADEA. 143 Thus, Judge Becker found that neither ele-
ment of the McMahon test was satisfied, mandating "rigorous" enforce-
ment of Nicholson's arbitration agreement under the FAA. 14 4
IV. ANALYSIS
The Nicholson court was faced with resolving the policies behind the
ADEA and the FAA. Additionally, the court was faced with two "hy-
brid" problems: (1) the ADEA has been termed a "hybrid" statute be-
cause it incorporates provisions of both Title VII and the FLSA,' 145 and
141. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227, 231.
142. Id. at 236 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent rejected the majority's
argument that a 1978 amendment to the ADEA tolling the statute of limitations,
29 U.S.C. § 626(e)(2), indicated legislative preference for a judicial forum. Id.
(Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent pointed out that Congress passed the toll-
ing amendment in response to fears that employers were improperly stalling
conciliation attempts beyond the statute of limitations. Id. at 236 (Becker, J.,
dissenting).
143. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 244 (Becker, J., dissenting). Judge Becker dis-
agreed with the majority's contention that Congress intended for the EEOC to
oversee all enforcement of the ADEA. Id. at 237 (Becker, J., dissenting). He
found it significant that the EEOC had made a formal proposal that courts en-
force voluntary settlement waivers of ADEA rights without EEOC supervision.
Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). See 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c) (1989) (proposed rule
allowing unsupervised waiver of ADEA rights). For a further discussion of this
proposal, see infra note 182 and accompanying text.
144. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 244 (Becker, J., dissenting).
145. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 578 (1978); compare Lorillard (FLSA
case law should guide interpretation of ADEA remedial and procedural provi-
sions) with Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979) (Title VII
case law guides interpretation of certain ADEA provisions). The ADEA incorpo-
rates the enforcement procedures of the FLSA. See supra notes 130-32 and ac-
companying text. Although Congress did not include age under Title VII, the
substantive and procedural provisions of Title VII and the ADEA are similar.
Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 630 (1982) (ADEA substantive provisions) with 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e, e-2, e-3 (1982) (Title VII provisions). For a further compari-
son, see Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV.
380 (1976). It is noted that despite the incorporation of FLSA provisions in the
ADEA, the EEOC has stated that "one purpose of the ADEA is to encourage the
voluntary and expeditious resolution of disputes. Thus, the ADEA is analogous
to Title VII in this respect .... Administrative Exemption Allowing for Waiv-
ers Under the ADEA, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,870, 40,871 (1985). This hybrid nature of
the ADEA has caused much confusion to litigants. See Lake, ADEA: A Review of
the Substantive Requirements, in AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT, A COM-
PLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 3,
8-10 (M. Lake ed. 1982) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE MANUAL].
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(2) Nicholson is a hybrid case. On the one hand, Nicholson's employment
discrimination claim invokes the history of labor arbitration and the
non-arbitrability of claims under Title VII and the FLSA. 14 6 On the
other hand, the arbitration clause in Nicholson's individual employment
contract invokes the policy and history of arbitration under the FAA.14 7
The McMahon test of arbitrability provided clear guidelines for the
court to resolve this hybrid case. It is submitted, however, that the Nich-
olson majority did not properly apply this test. Instead, the majority re-
lied on several broad assumptions to support its decision: (1) Mitsubishi,
McMahon and Rodriguez stand for the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments in "business" transactions only; (2) the Supreme Court's analysis
in Barrentine concerning the arbitrability of FLSA claims under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement provides guidance in this case; and (3) Con-
gress intended that the ADEA be enforced in court proceedings. Due to
such reliance, the holding of the Nicholson court exhibits the "old judicial
hostility to arbitration"' 48 and a failure to heed the mandate of the
FAA. 149
A. Business or Employment Case?
Although the Nicholson court appeared to follow the mandate of the
FAA in its application of the test of arbitrability, it characterized the
Third Trilogy as "[a] line of cases enforcing arbitration agreements in
the setting of business transactions."' 150 The court stated that nothing
in these "business" decisions suggested that the Supreme Court over-
ruled its prior precedent in Barrentine, Alexander and McDonald (the "la-
bor arbitration cases") that an arbitration award does not preclude
access to a judicial forum for the resolution of statutory claims.' 5 ' In-
stead of addressing the hybrid nature of this case, the court chose to rely
solely on the policy and history of the labor arbitration cases.
146. For a discussion of the history and status of labor arbitration, see supra
notes 30-61 and accompanying text.
147. For a discussion of the policy and history behind the FAA, see supra
notes 62-112 and accompanying text.
148. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1917, 1920 (1989) (quoting Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp.,
126 F.2d 978, 985 (2d Cir. 1942)).
149. For a discussion of the mandate of the FAA as set forth in the Third
Trilogy, see supra notes 88-113 and accompanying text.
150. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224.
151. Id. The dissent noted that "[t]he Court has never evinced an interpre-
tation of the FAA that would limit its application to commercial settings ....
Under the Court's analysis, the FAA mandates enforcement of private agree-
ments to arbitrate unless contrary congressional intent is shown; whether the
agreement is in a business setting is irrelevant." Id. at 233 n.3 (Becker, J., dis-
senting). The dissent also suggested that there is little difference between a se-
curities investor's agreement to arbitrate, as in McMahon, and an arbitration
agreement between a business executive (i.e., Nicholson) and his employer. Id.(Becker, J., dissenting).
418 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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The court attempted to distinguish Nicholson from the "business"
cases by characterizing it as a labor arbitration case.15 2 Nicholson cannot
be characterized as a labor arbitration case, however, because one key
element is missing: the collective bargaining agreement. 15 3 The labor
arbitration cases were decided on the Supreme Court's belief that an
individual's statutory rights are independent of the collective bargaining
process. 154
A major concern expressed by the Supreme Court in the labor arbi-
tration cases was that the union had exclusive control over the presenta-
tion of a grievant's claim in arbitration proceedings. 15 5 For example, a
union as collective bargaining agent may waive certain rights to obtain
benefits for all employees of the bargaining unit.156 This "majoritarian"
process is not present, however, in the context of an individual employ-
ment contract as in Nicholson. 15 7 As aptly characterized by the dissent,
152. See id. at 225. The majority stated that "[o]ur consideration of the ef-
fect of the statutory scheme [of the FLSA] on the arbitrability of ADEA claims is,
therefore, informed by the [Barrentine] decision." Id. The majority's sole re-
sponse to CPC's argument that Barrentine is distinguishable from the present
case was to "agree that further inquiry into the arbitrability of ADEA claims is
warranted, although we must give due regard to the authority provided by Bar-
rentine." Id.
153. See Coulson, Employment Contracts: The Misunderstood Labor Cases,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1990, at 3, col. 3, 8, col. 4 [hereinafter Misunderstood Labor
Cases] (author, President of AAA, distinguishes Nicholson from labor arbitration
cases involving collective bargaining); Coulson, supra note 120, at 25 (Gardner-
Denver holding not applicable to arbitration outside of collective bargaining pro-
cess, except as dictum); see also Pihl v. Thomson McKinnon Sec., 48 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 922, 295-26 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holdings in labor arbitration cases inap-
plicable to individually bargained agreements). But see Utley v. Goldman Sachs
& Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 842 (1989) (fact of plain-
tiff's individual employment agreement, rather than collective bargaining agree-
ment as in Alexander, not significant). For a discussion of the role of collective
bargaining agreements in labor arbitration, see supra notes 30-39 and accompa-
nying text.
154. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (in
§ 1983 action, Congress should not afford resjudicata effect to arbitration award
in collective bargaining process); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450
U.S. 728, 739 (1981) (FLSA rights belong to workers as individuals, not as mem-
bers of collective organization); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
51 (1974) (individual's Title VII right to equal employment opportunities sepa-
rate and distinct from rights created through "majoritarian processes" of collec-
tive bargaining).
155. In McDonald the Court stated that "when ... the union has exclusive
control over the 'mnner and extent to which an individual grievance is
presented' ... [t]he union's interests and those of the individual employee are
not always identical or even compatible. As a result, the union may present the
employee's grievance less vigorously .... " McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291 (citing
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19, and Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742). For a discussion
of the Alexander Court's additional concerns of racial discrimination by the union,
see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
156. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51, 58 & n.19.
157. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 235 (Becker, J., dissenting). Again, instead of
addressing the argument that the labor arbitration cases are distinguishable
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the task of the Supreme Court in the labor arbitration cases was to de-
cide "how best an individual's rights can be accommodated by the ma-
chinery of the collective bargaining process."' 5 8 The Nicholson court
was not faced with such a task.
The labor arbitration cases relied upon by the majority were also
based on a "general suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and the
competence of arbitral tribunals."' 159 Such suspicions have clearly been
rejected by the Supreme Court in the Third Trilogy. ' 60 In light of these
from Nicholson, the majority stated that "it does not follow, as CPC argues, that
the arbitration requirement in individually negotiated employment contracts is
therefore comparable to that contained in a contract entered into in a commer-
cial context. The disparity in bargaining power between an employer and an
individual employee is well known." Id. at 229. This argument lacks merit, how-
ever, because the employer is not representing the employee in the arbitration
process. Furthermore, in the Third Trilogy, the Court pointed to the language
of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2, that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract." See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627. As the dissent in Nicholson points out,
any problematic disparity in bargaining power could be used to attack the valid-
ity of the arbitration agreement. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 241-43 (Becker, J., dis-
senting). Likewise, in Rodriguez, the Court found that this type of contractual
relief served as an adequate protection for securities' buyers in their dealings
with sellers. Rodriguez, 109 S. Ct. at 1921.
158. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 232 (Becker, J., dissenting); see Alexander, 415
U.S. at 59-60 (Court characterized its task as one of "accommodation"); Note,
supra note 39, at 403 (Alexander Court's "accommodation" viewed as refusal to
extend policy favoring labor arbitration into conflict with antidiscrimination
policy).
159. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 234 (Becker, J., dissenting) (quoting McMahon,
482 U.S. at 231).
160. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting). In McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466
U.S. 284 (1984), the Supreme Court laid out four justifications for its decisions
in Alexander and Barrentine: (1) an arbitrator is unable to resolve complex statu-
tory issues; (2) arbitral factfinding is not equivalent to judicial factfinding; (3) an
arbitrator must enforce the collective bargaining agreement, even if it is in con-
flict with public law; and (4) the interests of the union and the employee are not
always compatible. Id. at 290-91. For a further discussion of these criticisms of
arbitration, see supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
The Nicholson majority conceded that the first two justifications were re-
jected by the Supreme Court in the Third Trilogy. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229. In
the Third Trilogy, the Court found that "arbitral tribunals are readily capable of
handling the factual and legal complexities of [antitrust and securities] claims,
notwithstanding the absence ofjudicial instruction and supervision." McMahon,
482 U.S. at 232; see Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 633-34. The third justification was
also rejected in the Third Trilogy: "[Tihere is no reason to assume at the outset
that arbitrator will not follow the law." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232 (citing Mitsub-
ishi, 473 U.S. at 636-37 & n. 19). As indicated above, the fourth justification is
not applicable to this case. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
One commentator has carried the analysis of arbitrator expertise, eviden-
tiary complexity and absence of discovery a step further. See Allison, Arbitration
Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting
Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REV. 219 (1986). Allison argues that decisions which
criticize commercial, as opposed to labor, arbitration on these grounds evidence
a " 'total unawareness of the varieties of arbitration procedure that are currently
420
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distinguishing factors, it is arguable that the majority's reliance on the
labor arbitration cases, specifically Barrentine, was misplaced.
It is further contended that the Nicholson court incorrectly con-
cluded that the reasoning of the so-called "business cases" was inappli-
cable. The issue in Nicholson was whether the mandate of the FAA
required enforcement of Nicholson's agreement to arbitrate. 16 1 To
override this mandate, the "business cases" required the plaintiff in
Nicholson to show a contrary congressional command in the text, history
or purposes of the ADEA.162 A complete application of the test of arbi-
trability reveals that arbitration is compatible with the history and pur-
poses of the ADEA.
B. A Complete Application of the Test of Arbitrability
The test of arbitrability requires an examination of the text, legisla-
tive history and purposes of the ADEA. 16 3 Although the ADEA is simi-
lar in content to both Title VII and the FLSA,16 4 the test requires an
analysis of the singular scheme of the ADEA, ' 6 5 without reliance on case
law interpreting Title VII and the FLSA. 16 6 The purposes of the ADEA
employed to avoid litigation,' and [an obsolete] conception of commercial arbi-
tration solely as a 'businessman's remedy to resolve commercial-type disputes'."
Id. at 244 (quoting Aksen, Arbitration and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1105 (1969)). Allison concludes that the inherent flexibil-
ity in the arbitrator selection process allows for greater arbitrator expertise. Id.
Allison also points out that limited discovery is available in arbitration proceed-
ings under the FAA. Id. at 248; see 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1988) (providing arbitrator with
complete subpoena power). With this power, for example, the arbitrator could
subpoena evidence and conduct discovery at a prehearing conference. Allison,
supra, at 248. Additionally, there is potential for court-ordered discovery in aid
of arbitration. Id. at 250; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-412 (1982 & Supp.
1989); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 3102(c) (McKinney 1970); 42 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7309(a) (Purdon 1981). Courts are becoming less reluctant to order
such discovery. Allison, supra, at 250; see generally DOMKE, supra note 3, § 27:00
(court assistance in arbitration discovery proceedings).
161. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224.
162. Id. (citing McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227).
163. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 227.
164. For a discussion of the "hybrid" nature of the ADEA, see supra note
145 and accompanying text.
165. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224. Although the Nicholson majority acknowl-
edged this point, it stated that it would be guided by the labor arbitration cases
and the Third Trilogy. Id. It is contended, however, that the court allowed itself
to be guided primarily by the labor arbitration decisions and did not apply a
discrete analysis of the ADEA scheme.
166. See Coventry v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521 n.8 (3d
Cir. 1988) (rejecting notion that ADEA should be interpreted as consistent with
FLSA in every instance). Courts often choose to interpret the ADEA in accord-
ance with Title VII or FLSA case law, depending on which position is being
supported. See Note, Waiver of Rights Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1070 (1986) (outcome in ADEA waiver cases
turns on whether court views FLSA or Title VII precedent as controlling).
NOTE
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are unique and distinguishable from those of Title VII and the FLSA. 167
Furthermore, it is contended that an analysis of Nicholson is not depen-
dent on any distinction between Title VII and the FLSA, but on the dis-
tinction between arbitration under a private contract and under a
collective bargaining agreement. 168
1. Legislative History
The Nicholson majority, while not finding it conclusive, determined
that the legislative history of the ADEA established a congressional in-
tent "in favor of enforcement of ADEA claims in court proceedings." 169
The majority based its conclusion on Congress' incorporation of the
FLSA enforcement scheme into the ADEA.170 An analysis of the legisla-
tive history of the ADEA, however, reveals that Congress adopted the
FLSA enforcement scheme for reasons of expediency and not because of
a preference for court proceedings. 17 1
It is further contended that a proper analysis of the legislative his-
tory of the ADEA would have included the role of conciliation in ADEA
enforcement.172 The ADEA vests primary enforcement power with the
EEOC, and the individual's right of action under the ADEA is "secon-
167. Note, supra note 166, at 1077-79; see House Hearings on ADEA, supra note
130 at 449 (remarks of Sen. Burke) ("Age discrimination is not the same as the
invidious discrimination based on race or creed prejudices and bigotry."); Note,
supra note 145, at 395-98 (Title VII serves comprehensive social functions of
ameliorating widespread effects of past discrimination and providing positive
role models; same cannot be said of ADEA).
168. For a discussion of the distinctions between arbitration under an indi-
vidual contract and a collective bargaining agreement, see supra notes 153-58 &
infra notes 205-14 and accompanying text.
169. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226. For a complete discussion of the grounds
supporting the majority's conclusion, see supra notes 130-33 and accompanying
text.
170. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226.
171. Congress chose the FLSA enforcement scheme, with the Department
of Labor as primary enforcer, because of a consensus that the EEOC, which was
originally created to process Title VII complaints, was overburdened. See Senate
Hearings on ADEA, supra note 130, at 24-25 (statement of Sen. Javitz). Congress
felt that ADEA complaints would be handled more efficiently by the Wage and
Hour Division of the Department of Labor. Id. Since the incorporation of the
FLSA enforcement scheme, responsibility for ADEA enforcement has been
transferred from the Department of Labor to the EEOC. See Reorganization
Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 C.F.R. § 321 (1979), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. app. at 1366
(1988) and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978). It is further noted that when the EEOC took
over this responsibility, it officially stated that regulations pertaining to ADEA
enforcement should "be interpreted in a manner which is consistent with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964," not the FLSA. 44 Fed. Reg. 68,858 (1979).
172. See H.R. REP. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1967), reprinted in
1967 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2218 ("It is intended that the responsi-
bility for enforcement vested in the [EEOC] . . .be initially and exhaustively
directed through informal methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion
and formal methods applied only in the ultimate sense.").
422 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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dary.' 173 The ADEA directs that the EEOC effect enforcement primar-
ily through "informal methods of conciliation, conference, and
persuasion.''174 Only if this informal approach fails to result in volun-
tary compliance can a formal court action be commenced. 175 In addi-
tion to conciliation by the EEOC, the ADEA requires resort to available
state remedies before a federal action is permitted.1 7 6
The Nicholson majority analyzed the conciliatory role of the EEOC in
its discussion of "inherent incompatibility."' 77 The majority stated that
"[t]he EEOC's role in conciliation... is another significant indicator of
Congress' intent as to the procedure it preferred to be followed for age
discrimination claims." 7 8 It is ironic that this aspect of Congress' in-
tent was not mentioned in the majority's "legislative history" analysis.
The majority's discussion of Congress' preference for conciliation is in-
compatible with its conclusion that Congress intended for enforcement
of ADEA claims in court proceedings.
As a result of the Nicholson majority's misreading of Congress' incor-
poration of the FLSA into the ADEA and its failure to properly consider
the ADEA's conciliation process in its examination of the statute's legis-
lative history, the first element of the test of arbitrability was not satis-
fied. Thus, the legislative history of the ADEA is conclusive regarding
the arbitration of ADEA claims-Congress showed no intent to preclude
173. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 224. Prior to filing suit, an individual must file a
charge with the EEOC and wait 60 days before filing suit while the EEOC at-
tempts to effect "voluntary compliance." 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (1982). This con-
ciliation provision is not incorporated from the FLSA. See Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977) (Congress preferred
conciliation and mediation as the "most favored method of enforcement" of
ADEA), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). The right of an individual to bring
suit terminates upon commencement of an action by the EEOC. 29 U.S.C.
§ 626(c) (1982).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
175. Id. § 626(d). When the EEOC brings suit, courts will ensure that prior
EEOC conciliation attempts were adequate. See Brennan v. Ace Hardware
Corp., 495 F.2d 368, 374 (8th Cir. 1974) (EEOC must use "exhaustive" at-
tempts to conciliate before legal action begun); Note, Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment: Available Federal Relief, 11 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 281, 291 (1975)
("Because the ADEA emphasizes compliance through conciliation rather than
court action, the courts have properly asked not only whether there was an at-
tempt at conciliation, but also whether the attempt made was adequate.").
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1982).
177. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227. For a discussion of the majority's argument
that there is an inherent conflict between arbitration and the purposes of the
ADEA, see supra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
178. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228. The majority also cited "Congress' clear
intent that compliance with the ADEA be overseen by [the EEOC]." Id. at 227
(emphasis added). Although the court was attempting to establish the role of
the charge process in the EEOC enforcement scheme and that arbitration inter-
feres with the process, it is submitted that the court was in fact outlining con-
gressional intent. A proper analysis of the legislative history of the ADEA
should have included the role of the conciliation process.
1990] NOTE 423
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waiver of a judicial forum. 179
2. Inherent Conflict
With regard to the second element of the test of arbitrability, the
majority made several attempts to establish an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the purposes of the ADEA. 180 The majority's central
argument was that Congress intended for the EEOC to oversee enforce-
ment of the ADEA, and private arbitration of ADEA claims interferes
with this scheme.' 81 The dissent disagreed with the majority's position,
noting that the EEOC has made a formal proposal that courts enforce
voluntary waivers of ADEA rights without EEOC supervision.' 82 Thus,
the EEOC itself does not support the majority's conclusion that the
EEOC must oversee all enforcement of the ADEA.18 3 In fact, due to the
incredible backlog in EEOC investigations, it is now impossible for the
179. See id. at 236 (Becker, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 227-29. The majority set forth the following reasons: (1) arbi-
tration interferes with the EEOC's oversight authority; (2) arbitration detracts
from the EEOC charge requirement; and (3) arbitrators lack the power to award
appropriate equitable or class relief under the ADEA. Id. See supra notes 135-41
and accompanying text.
181. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 227. For a discussion of the EEOC's oversight
and investigatory powers, see supra note 136 & infra notes 191-92 and accompa-
nying text.
182. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 237 (Becker, J., dissenting); see Note, Waivers
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.- Putting the Fair Labor Standards Act
Criteria to Rest, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 382, 384 (1987) ("waiver" refers to a
contractual waiver of rights made in exchange for valuable consideration).
There is a general concensus in the courts that private waiver of ADEA claims is
not inconsistent with the ADEA. See Bormann v. AT & T Communs., Inc., 875
F.2d 399, 403 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 292 (1989) (release of ADEA
claims in private settlement without EEOC supervision is permissible); Coventry
v. United States Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 518 (3d Cir. 1988) (employee may
execute knowing and willful waiver of ADEA claim); Runyan v. National Cash
Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th Cir.) (private, unsupervised waiver of
employee's claim is valid means of settlement), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986);
see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 & n. 15 (1974) (setting
forth possibility of knowing and voluntary waiver of rights under Title VII).
The EEOC has taken a position of non-involvement by proposing that
courts enforce voluntary nonprospective waivers of ADEA rights without EEOC
supervision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c) (1989). In 1986, EEOC Commissioner
R. Gaull Silberman argued in support of this proposal that EEOC supervision of
waiver agreements would swamp the EEOC with "additional demands for its
increasingly scarce resources, resulting in ... unnecessary bureaucratic delays."
Silberman & Bolick, The EEOC's Proposed Rule on Releases of Claims Under the ADEA,
37 LAB. L.J. 195, 200 (1986). This proposal has been suspended for congres-
sional hearings on the topic. See Pub. L. No. 100-459, 102 Stat. 2216 (1988). A
recent bill has been proposed to limit the effect of the EEOC's proposal. See Age
Discrimination in Employment Waiver Protection Act of 1989, S. 54, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S357 (daily ed. Jan. 25, 1989); 135 CONG. REC.
E816 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Hawkins).
183. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 237 (Becker, J., dissenting).
424 [Vol. 35: p. 389
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EEOC to be so involved. 184
In enforcing the ADEA, the EEOC must encourage resolution of
disputes through "informal" methods of conciliation and mediation.
18 5
Arbitration, another informal method of dispute resolution, is thus con-
sistent, rather than in conflict with the purposes of the ADEA. 186 The
majority even recognized that an employee's voluntary submission of his
or her ADEA claim to arbitration was consistent with the purposes of the
ADEA.187 As the dissent pointed out, the majority failed to explain why
parties should be permitted to bypass the oversight of the EEOC volun-
tarily but not through enforcement of an arbitration agreement.' 8 8
Thus, parties should not be precluded from bypassing the EEOC
through enforcement of a voluntarily executed arbitration agreement.
The majority also found that arbitration interferes with the ADEA
charge requirement.' 8 9 The dissent found that the facts of this case run
counter to such a conclusion.' 9 0 As previously noted, the EEOC has
184. See generally The EEOC's Performance in Enforcing the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1988) (since 1984, EEOC delay has caused upwards of 7,500 ADEA
charges to exceed statute of limitations for filing suit); EEOC Delays in Processing
Age Discrimination Charges: Hearing Before Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Gov't Oper-
ations, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1988) (total number of lawsuits filed by EEOC
has increased by 100% from 1982-1987 while congressional appropriations have
decreased); see also Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988, P.L. 100-
283, 102 Stat. 78 (1988) (allowing for parties to bring civil action when EEOC
delay causes running of statute of limitations).
185. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982).
186. The dissent also noted legislative history of Congress' intent that the
ends of the ADEA be achieved by bargaining between employee and employer
without supervision by any neutral arbiter: "[T]he Act should allow the em-
ployee to 'resolve the dispute himself or work out a compromise with an em-
ployer.' " Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 241 n.13 (Becker, J., dissenting) (quoting 123
CONG. REc. S17275 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Williams)). Fur-
ther, it has been suggested that the EEOC may arbitrate a claim under its au-
thority to seek "voluntary compliance." See Morgan v. Washington Mfg. Co.,
660 F.2d 710, 711 (6th Cir. 1981) (Congress created EEOC to encourage recon-
ciliation and arbitration of employee grievances prior to litigation).
187. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229 n.9.-
188. Id. at 241 n. 13 (Becker, J., dissenting). The majority's approval of vol-
untary arbitration after a dispute arises is also inconsistent with its conclusion
that the disparity of bargaining power between an employer and older employ-
ees affects an employee's decision to sign a standard predispute arbitration
agreement. Id. at 229. The majority fails to point out any difference in bargain-
ing power in the two situations.
189. Id. at 227. For a discussion of the majority's argument, see supra notes
136-41 and accompanying text.
190. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting). Nicholson filed a
charge with the EEOC and then withdrew the charge in order to file suit. Id.
(Becker, J., dissenting). Thus, the EEOC had an opportunity to investigate, con-
ciliate or file suit, and its involvement was not lessened because of Nicholson's
arbitration agreement. Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
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investigative authority that is independent of the charge process.' 9'
Thus, the plaintiff in Nicholson, by signing an agreement to arbitrate, did
not sign away the EEOC's power to investigate or bring suit under the
ADEA. 19 2 Rather, Nicholson had only signed away his individual right
to bring suit, "a right which is secondary to the enforcement powers of
the EEOC.' '1 93
In its "inherent conflict" analysis, the majority also tried to show
that arbitration is not an adequate forum for enforcement of the
ADEA.' 9 4 The majority found the arbitration process inadequate be-
cause arbitral tribunals do not possess the power of courts to award
"broad equitable relief."' 195 It is suggested that the majority's concern
stems from a concept in labor arbitration that an arbitrator is limited to
the terms of the bargain and must enforce the bargain over the public
law.' 96 A private agreement to arbitrate, such as that involved in Nichol-
son, however, differs greatly from a collective bargaining agreement. 19 7
191. For a discussion of the EEOC's investigatory power, see supra note 136
and accompanying text.
192. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting). The charge mecha-
nism is only a prerequisite to an individual's right to bring suit and does not
affect the primary investigative role of the EEOC. Investigations may be initi-
ated by any information available, such as a confidential complaint, news stories
or employer advertisements. See Williams, EEOC's ADEA Enforcement Policies and
Procedures, in COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 145, at 256, 264.
193. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing Rogers v. Ex-
xon Research & Eng'g Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841 (3d Cir. 1977) (private lawsuits
secondary to conciliation and suits by EEOC), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978)).
The majority found that employees will have little incentive to file charges if they
must arbitrate their claims and cannot thereafter proceed to a judicial forum. Id.
at 227. The dissent noted that an arbitration agreement may not preclude an
aggrieved party from filing a charge with the EEOC. Id. at 239 (Becker, J., dis-
senting) (citing EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc., 821 F.2d 1085, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1987)(waiver of right to file charge with EEOC void as against public policy)). The
dissent further noted that an employee who must proceed to arbitration may
have an incentive to file an ADEA charge in order to seek investigatory assist-
ance from the EEOC. Id. at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 228-29.
195. Id. at 228; see 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1982) (court shall grant legal or equi-
table relief necessary to effectuate purposes of ADEA).
196. For a discussion of this concept, see supra notes 33, 47 & infra note 197
and accompanying text. This argument has been rejected by the Supreme Court
in the Third Trilogy: "[T]here is not reason to assume at the outset that arbitra-
tors will not follow the law ...." McMahon, 482 U.S. at 232.
197. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 235 (Becker, J., dissenting). The scope of the
arbitration agreement and the power of the arbitrator in Nicholson's individual
employment contract were very broad. For the text of this provision, see supra
note 120 and accompanying text. Because of the broad arbitration provisions in
commercial contracts, arbitrators are free to apply the applicable law. See gener-
ally DOMKE, supra note 3, §§ 25:00-04. In contrast, arbitration clauses in collec-
tive bargaining agreements are very limiting on the arbitrator. See, e.g., Alexander,
415 U.S. at 40 n.3 ("The arbitrator shall not amend, take away, add to, or
change any of the provisions of this Agreement, and the arbitrator's decision
must be based solely upon an interpretation of the provisions of this Agree-
426
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Additionally, although the ADEA does not provide for arbitration, the
American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules provide for broad equi-
table remedies by an arbitrator. 198 Thus, the AAA Rules applicable to
this case provide ample authority to protect and enforce an individual's
rights under the ADEA.
As a final point, the majority found arbitration procedures inade-
quate because an arbitrator could not provide class relief.199 Courts
currently are not in agreement on whether arbitration can proceed as a
class action.20 0 However, as the dissent argued, even if Nicholson were
ment."); Handley v. Phillips, 715 F. Supp. 657, 665 (M.D. Pa. 1989) ("the arbi-
trator shall have no authority . . . to pass upon issues governed by law or
applicable governmental administrative rules and regulations thereunder"). Be-
cause of the restrictive nature of the clauses in collective bargaining agreements,
commentators have long debated whether labor arbitrators can look outside the
agreement to the reasoning and remedies of external law. See Scheinholtz &
Miscimarra, The Arbitrator as Judge and Jury: Another Look at Statutory Law in Arbitra-
tion, ARB. J., June 1985, at 55-59 (setting forth guidelines as to when arbitrator
may consider statutory issues); see also Nolan & Abrams, American Labor Arbitra-
tion: The Maturing Years, 35 U. FLA. L. REV. 557, 614-21 (1983) (reviewing opin-
ions on appropriateness of applying external law in arbitration); Howlett, The
Role of Law in Arbitration: A Reprise, DEVELOPMENTS IN AMERICAN AND FOREIGN
ARBITRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL MEETING OF THE NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 64, 68 (1968) (arbitrators may have more ex-
pertise in labor law than judges).
198. See Rule 43, Commercial Rules, supra note 120 ("It]he Arbitrator may
grant any remedy or relief which the Arbitrator deems just and equitable and
within the scope of the agreement"). In Nicholson the arbitration agreement pro-
vided that the AAA Rules were to be applied. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 223. If, as
the dissent suggests, the Employment Rules are applied, "[t]he Arbitrator may
grant any remedy or relief that a court having jurisdiction of the matter could
grant." Rule 25, Employment Rules, supra note 120; see Willoughby Roofing &
Supply Co. v. Kajima Int'l, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 353 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (arbitrators
have authority to award punitive damages under broad arbitration clause), aff'd,
776 F.2d 269 (11 th Cir. 1985). The Employment Rules also provide that the
parties' attorneys may draft a submission agreement identifying the law to be
applied in the arbitration proceeding. Rule 2, Employment Rules, supra note
120. Parties may also file written briefs. Rule 20, Employment Rules, supra note
120. Because of the additional safeguards provided in the Employment Rules,
an arbitrator can be informed of the applicable provisions and remedies of the
ADEA before making his award.
199. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228-29 ("Congress' intent that courts hearing an
ADEA action be invested with power to resolve the problem of age discrimina-
tion effectively is reflected in the statutory provision authorizing maintenance of
a collective action .... "); see 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982). This argument is similar
to Nicholson's argument that the explicit right to a jury trial under the ADEA
demonstrates Congress' intent that access to a judicial forum be nonwaivable
under the ADEA. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 226 n.5. Because the Supreme
Court ignored the effect of the right to a jury in the Third Trilogy, the Nicholson
court did not rely on this aspect of the ADEA's legislative history. Id. Similarly,
a provision for collective action cannot be dispositive on the issue of arbitrability
of ADEA claims.
200. See, e.g., Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 240 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citing M.
HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION 240-41 (1981)). Generally, sep-
arate arbitration proceedings may be consolidated by the courts when one party
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forced to arbitrate his ADEA claim, this would in no way prevent the
EEOC from investigating other incidents of age discrimination at
CPC.2 0 1 If attempts at voluntary compliance failed, the EEOC could
then bring an action on behalf of a class. Thus, the fact that the ADEA
provides for the possibility of a class action does not mean that ADEA
claims cannot be enforced in arbitration proceedings.
In conclusion, the plaintiff in Nicholson failed to demonstrate an in-
herent conflict between arbitration and the purposes of the ADEA.
Thus, the second element of the McMahon test of arbitrability was not
satisfied. In fact, arbitration could work to ease the backlog of the
EEOC and is thus compatible with the purposes of the ADEA. 20 2 This
Note supports Judge Becker's dissenting opinion in Nicholson that noth-
ing in the text, history or purpose of the ADEA provides a "contrary
congressional command" to override the mandate of the FAA. 203
C. Beyond the Test
Because of the hybrid nature of Nicholson, it is important to look
beyond the test of arbitrability and consider the concerns expressed in
the labor arbitration cases that arbitration cannot adequately protect an
individual's statutory rights. 20 4
One concern expressed by the Court in the labor arbitration cases
is common to the arbitrations. DOMKE, supra note 3, § 27:02. However, the role
of consolidation is left to the courts and not provided for in the AAA Rules. Id.
Consolidation is arguably similar in purpose to the class action. See Keating v.
Superior Court, 31 Cal. 3d 584, 611-12, 645 P.2d 1192, 1208-09, 183 Cal. Rptr.
360, 376-77 (1982), appeal dismissed in part, rev'd in part, sub nom. Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984). The Supreme Court of California has found no
legal bar to arbitration by a class. See id. The California view, however, has not
been embraced in the small number of courts considering this issue. See, e.g.,
Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 82 A.D.2d 87, 441 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1981)
(ordering arbitration of claims individually, not as class), aft'd, 56 N.Y.2d 627,
453 N.E.2d 1097, 450 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1982); see generally Note, Classwide Arbitra-
tion: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire, 67 VA. L. REV. 789 (1981).
201. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 238 (Becker, J., dissenting).
202. For a discussion of the present EEOC backlog, see supra note 184 and
accompanying text. There is no indication that this backlog will improve. See
EEOC Enforcement of the ADEA: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1980) (EEOC reported backlog of 4,000 unprocessed ADEA
cases in first year of administration of ADEA). It is estimated that the number of
employees subject to the ADEA's protection will increase to 60 million by the
year 2000 as the working population ages. See Age Bias Claims Mount as Demo-
graphic, Legal, Economic Pressures Increase, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 53, at
c-I (Mar. 19, 1985). The EEOC's power is thus greatly diminished by this back-
log. For the discussion of a proposal to ease this backlog, while protecting
ADEA claimants, see infra notes 225-37 and accompanying text.
203. See Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 244; see also Misunderstood Labor Cases, supra
note 153, at 3, col. I (anticipating that Judge Becker's dissenting views will be
upheld by Supreme Court).
204. For a discussion of these concerns, see supra notes 47-49, 155 & 160
and accompanying text.
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was the constraint on arbitrators to apply the terms of the collective bar-
gaining agreement, rather than external law. In Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver the Court was concerned that an arbitrator would not be bound to
follow the directives of Title VII in deciding a discrimination grievance
because "[w]here the collective-bargaining agreement conflicts with Ti-
tle VII, the arbitrator must follow the agreement. °2 0 5 In contrast, arbi-
tration agreements in individual employment contracts are usually
broad, creating no conflicts for the arbitrator in choosing to enforce the
law or the terms of the agreement.20 6 There is presently a debate in
labor arbitration circles as to what extent the arbitrator may apply public
law concepts. 20 7 The concerns in this debate, however, are inapplicable
to arbitration under the FAA.2 0 8 Further, the FAA provision for judicial
review of arbitration awards helps to ensure that arbitrators are comply-
ing with statutory purposes and remedies.2 0 9
In the labor arbitration cases the Court was also concerned that the
union's control of the arbitration process might result in inadequate
representation of an employee's individual statutory rights. 2 10
Although that concern was not an issue in Nicholson which involved an
individual employment contract, the Nicholson majority expressed that a
similar type of disparity of bargaining power exists between the em-
ployer and older employees. 2 11 While the majority's concern deserves
205. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 57. For a further discussion of this concern, see
supra note 47 and accompanying text.
206. For a discussion of this difference in the scope of arbitration agree-
ments, see supra note 197 and accompanying text.
207. For a discussion of this debate, see supra note 197 and accompanying
text.
208. See supra notes 197-98 and accompanying text. Under the AAA Rules,
the arbitrator is generally not limited in his or her application of external law in
arbitration proceedings. See supra note 198 and accompanying text. The Em-
ployment Rules were drafted so that arbitrators, well versed in legal concepts,
could determine statutory rights. See Coulson, supra note 120, at 24.
209. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988). The FAA provides the following grounds for
review of an arbitration award: (1) procural of award by fraud-or corruption, id.
§ 10(a); (2) evident partiality of the arbitrator, id. § 10(b); (3) arbitrator miscon-
duct, id. § 10(c); and (4) arbitrator's abuse of powers, id. § 10(d). For the full
text of this provision, see supra note 71 and accompanying text. Under 9 U.S.C.
§ 10(d), a court may consider the appropriateness or ambiguity of the award. See
Ray, supra note 38, at 88. In many cases, this section has provided the basis for a
court to remand a matter to the arbitrator for clarification of the scope of an
award or to clarify its application. See id. Although the "abuse" standard is diffi-
cult to meet, the Court in Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987), found that judicial review under § 10 of the FAA is "sufficient
to ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the [securities] stat-
ute. Id. at 232.
210. For a discussion of the Court's reasoning, see supra note 49 and ac-
companying text.
211. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 229. The court stated:
Older employees who have invested many years of their career with a
particular employer may lack any 'ealistic option to refuse to sign a
standard form arbitration agreement presented to them by their em-
1990] 429NOTE
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consideration, procedural safeguards already exist which protect elderly
employees from such disparity of bargaining power: (1) the FAA pro-
vides that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract;" 2 12 (2) the aged employee can choose counsel and the procedures
to be followed in an arbitration proceeding;2 13 and (3) despite an agree-
ment to arbitrate, an individual may still file a charge with the EEOC to
protect his or her rights and those of similarly situated employees. 2 14
Finally, in addition to the concerns expressed in the labor arbitra-
tion cases, the Nicholson majority was troubled by the EEOC's lack of
supervisory authority over private arbitration procedures. 2 15 The ma-
jority contrasted this absence of regulatory power with the power of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to ensure the adequacy of
arbitration procedures employed in securities disputes. 2 16 However, as
noted by the dissent, the power of an administrative agency to regulate
arbitration cannot be dispositive of whether the FAA will be en-
forced. 2 17 While no agency issues regulations with respect to arbitra-
tion of RICO or antitrust claims, the Supreme Court upheld the
arbitrability of such claims in Rodriquez and McMahon.2 18 Additionally,
the ADEA provides the EEOC with broad power to implement regula-
tions in enforcing the ADEA.2 19 Thus, the EEOC could use this power
ployers .... Although this may not constitute the type of duress which
renders a contract voidable, we cannot close our eyes to the realities of
the workplace.
Id.
212. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). The majority appears to be arguing that this
provision of the FAA is not an adequate protection. As the dissent points out,
however, the relative bargaining power of the parties is a relevant consideration
for a court in determining whether to enforce a contract to arbitrate. Nicholson,
877 F.2d at 242 (Becker, J., dissenting).
213. If, as in Nicholson, the AAA Rules apply, the parties themselves have
the power to formulate the arbitration procedure. For a discussion of these
rules, see supra notes 120 & 198 and accompanying text. Both the Employment
and Commercial Arbitration Rules provide for representation by counsel. See
Rule 9, Employment Rules, and Rule 22, Commercial Rules, supra note 120.
214. For a discussion of the individual's right to file a charge and the
EEOC's broad investigatory powers, see supra notes 136 & 193 and accompany-
ing text.
215. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 228 ("[N]o statutory provision gives the EEOC
the power to affect the arbitration procedure.").
216. Id. In McMahon the Supreme Court emphasized that the 1975 amend-
ments to § 19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the SEC broad power
to regulate the arbitration procedures used by self-regulatory organizations
(SROs). McMahon, 482 U.S. at 223. Under these rules, no proposed SRO arbi-
tration rule change may take effect without SEC approval. See 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1988). The SEC has the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete from" any SRO
rule. See id. § 78s(c). For a further discussion of these provisions, see supra note
103 and accompanying text.
217. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 239 (Becker, J., dissenting).
218. Id. (BeckerJ., dissenting).
219. See 29 U.S.C. § 628 (1982) (EEOC "may issue such rules and regula-
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to implement explicit procedures for arbitrating ADEA claims under the
FAA. 22
0
V. RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION
"[D]elay is always unfortunate, but it is particularly so in the case of
older citizens to whom, by definition, relatively few productive years are
left."122 ' Due to excessive delays by the EEOC and in the courts, arbitra-
tion is an appropriate alternative to a judicial forum for protecting indi-
vidual's rights under the ADEA.2 22 The Supreme Court has recognized
the need for a strong federal policy favoring arbitration.2 23 A proposal
of specific procedural requirements for arbitration of ADEA claims is
the best response to the needs of ADEA claimants and the mandate of
the FAA.
2 2 4
A. A Proposal
A proposal for final and binding arbitration of ADEA claims should
include the following provisions:
tions as it may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying out [the ADEA]
. .. "); see also Edwards, Arbitration as an Alternative in Equal Employment Disputes,
ARB.J., Dec. 1978, at 23, 26 (proposing the EEOC implement its own arbitration
procedures).
220. The EEOC already uses this power to define EEOC enforcement au-
thority. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1626.15 (1989). The EEOC has also used this
power to propose a procedure for settlement of ADEA claims through private
waivers of ADEA rights without EEOC supervision. See 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c)
(1989). For a further discussion of this proposed regulation, see supra note 182
and accompanying text.
221. Senate Hearings on ADEA, supra note 130, at 24 (statement of Sen.
Javitz).
222. For a discussion of the backlog in EEOC investigations and in the fed-
eral courts, see supra notes 1, 184 & 202 and accompanying text.
223. For a discussion of this policy, see supra notes 9-12 & 82-113 and ac-
companying text.
224. This proposal could take the form of an EEOC regulation, an amend-
ment to the ADEA or an amendment to the FAA. A proposed EEOC regulation
is particularly vulnerable to challenges in court or from subsequent EEOC ad-
ministrators. In contrast, a congressional statement that final arbitration of
ADEA claims is a legitimate means of carrying out the purposes of the ADEA
would eliminate inconsistent court decisions. See Note, supra note 182, at 405
(discussing inconsistent interpretation of waiver proposal). For an example of
the courts' inconsistency in determining arbitrability of ADEA claims, see supra
note 118 and accompanying text.
Additionally, the Nicholson majority stated that if Congress desires to "[shift]
enforcement of the ADEA away from the courts to arbitration," Congress
should explicitly so state. Nicholson, 877 F.2d at 231. Congress has already re-
sponded to the incredible EEOC backlog by enacting legislation to allow ADEA
claimants to bring suit after the expiration of the statute of limitations due to
EEOC delay. See Age Discrimination Claims Assistance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No.
100-283, 102 Stat. 78 (1988). A similar amendment to the ADEA providing pro-
cedures for final and binding arbitration would be the most effective method for
carrying out this proposal.
NOTE
43
Gillin: A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protec
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
(1) WAIVER OF THE PROCEDURAL FORUM 22 5
(a) A predispute agreement to arbitrate ADEA claims arising
under an employment contract is enforceable "save upon such grounds
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."12 26
(b) Such agreement is enforceable under the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. 2
2 7
(2) RULES FOR ARBITRATION PROCEDURES 228
(a) It is recommended that such arbitration agreements pro-
vide for arbitration according to the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), as amended from time to time.22 9
(b) If the agreement provides for arbitration under the AAA
Rules, the AAA Employment Dispute Arbitration Rules should be fol-
lowed, as amended from time to time. 230
(c) If the agreement does not provide for the use of such
rules, the arbitration procedures must meet the requirements of section
(3).
(3) ALTERNATE RULES
An arbitration award shall be considered valid and final if the arbi-
tration proceeding contains the following essential elements: 23 '
(a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the
proceeding; 232
(b) The right on behalf of a party to present evidence and
legal argument in support of the party's contentions and fair opportu-
225. This heading embodies the standard set forth by Judge Becker's dis-
sent in Nicholson. See 877 F.2d at 241 (Becker, J., dissenting). The dissent be-
lieved that waiver of the judicial forum is not precluded by the ADEA, yet
remained sensitive to the possibility that the agreement to arbitrate resulted
from fraud or "overwhelming economic power." Id. (Becker, J., dissenting).
Judge Becker emphasized that "careful attention would have to be paid ... to
these basic contract principles." Id. at 242 (Becker, J., dissenting).
226. This standard is copied from § 2 of the FAA. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
227. This provision incorporates Chapter 1 of the FAA. See id. §§ 1-15.
The FAA provisions are essential for the enforcement of arbitration agreements
and judicial review of arbitration awards. For a discussion of these provisions,
see supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
228. This provision attempts to respond to criticisms that arbitral proce-
dures are inadequate to protect employee rights. For a discussion of these criti-
cisms, see supra notes 46-49 & 205-15 and accompanying text.
229. For a discussion of the AAA Rules, see supra notes 2, 120 & 198 and
accompanying text. The AAA has the capacity to supervise arbitration proceed-
ings and could be instrumental in carrying out a proposal for final and binding
arbitration of ADEA claims.
230. See id. The Employment Rules provide for discovery, formal rules of
evidence, and other procedural safeguards which are usually lacking in labor
arbitration and under the Commercial Rules.
231. These provisions are taken from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDG-
MENTS § 84 (1982). Section 84(3)(b) states that arbitration proceedings which
provide the essential elements of adjudication outlined in § 83(2) are entitled to
preclusive effect.
232. See id. § 83(2)(a).
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nity to rebut evidence and argument by opposing parties; 2 33
(c) A rule of finality, specifying a point in the proceeding
when presentations are terminated and a final decision is rendered; 2 34
and
(d) Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to
make the proceeding sufficient to determine the matter in question con-
clusively, having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter
in question, the urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and
the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and formulate legal
contentions. 2 35
(4) Arbitration under these rules shall in no way effect the EEOC's
rights and responsibilities to enforce the ADEA. 23 6
B. Conclusion
The majority opinion in Nicholson does not demonstrate the requi-
site "contrary congressional command" in the ADEA to override the
mandate of the FAA. As demonstrated above, the concerns of the labor
arbitration cases are inapplicable to the present case and arguably out-
dated given the Supreme Court's present overwhelming support for ar-
bitration. Furthermore, the procedural safeguards provided by the
FAA, the EEOC investigative process and the AAA Rules can provide
adequate protection of employee rights under the ADEA. Therefore,
agreements to arbitrate ADEA claims must be enforced.
The above proposal would remove any criticisms or inadequacies of
arbitration that may remain, despite the Supreme Court's declaration of
the mandate of the FAA. The present enforcement structure of the
ADEA has proven inadequate. 2 37 If the proposed recommendation is
implemented, arbitration can be used as an adequate alternative for the
protection of the rights of ADEA claimants. The proposal should cause
courts and arbitrators to focus on the formation of the arbitration agree-
ment, the proper application of the provisions and remedies of the
ADEA and the adequacy of the arbitration procedure. ADEA claimants
will be given the rights and protections traditionally accorded to con-
tracting parties under the FAA, and additional safeguards required by
their "employee" status.
Leslie M. Gillin
233. See id. § 83(2)(b).
234. See id. § 83(2)(d).
235. See id. § 83(2)(e).
236. This provision is adopted from 29 C.F.R. § 1627.16(c) (1989) (EEOC
proposal for unsupervised waivers). For a discussion of this proposal, see supra
note 182 and accompanying text.
237. For a discussion of the EEOC backlog, see supra notes 184 & 202 and
accompanying text.
45
Gillin: A Test of Arbitrability: Does Arbitration Provide Adequate Protec
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
46
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [1990], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss2/4
